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Abstract
On June 9, 1851, nine men under the direction of a steamboat captain and land
speculator named William Tichenor landed on the southern coast of the Oregon Territory
at present-day Port Orford with the intention of establishing a permanent settlement.
Tichenor’s plan was to establish a commercial port that would supply gold mining
endeavors in the interior. The landing party’s instructions were to survey the townsite
while Tichenor traveled to San Francisco to gather more men and supplies. Before
departing, he promised the group he would return in exactly two weeks. He also assured
them that the local Quatomah Indians, who had lived in the area for generations, were
friendly and peaceful.
When Tichenor returned to the site, two days later than he had promised, he
discovered that a violent confrontation had taken place atop a large, rocky promontory on
the beach. The landing party was nowhere to be found and a subsequent investigation led
to the discovery of two discarded journals which provided insight into what had
transpired. As a result, it was assumed that all the men in the landing party had either
been killed or taken captive by the Quatomah, and a letter was quickly sent to the editor
of a Portland newspaper giving a suspiciously contrived account of the grim discovery. It
had been written by a San Francisco attorney named D.S. Roberts, who not only claimed
that Tichenor had arrived back at Port Orford on time, but that the landing party had
recklessly fled their fortified camp and were therefore ultimately at fault for whatever had
befallen them.
One week after Tichenor had returned to the site, the missing landing party turned
up alive and well at a settlement approximately 65 miles to the north. After reading
i

Roberts’ account of their supposed demise in the newspaper, the appointed leader of the
group, J.M. Kirkpatrick, became upset by the claim that he and the others may have acted
foolishly by abandoning their camp prior to Tichenor’s return. Leaving the rest of the
group behind, Kirkpatrick quickly traveled to Portland where he presented a letter to the
editor of a local newspaper refuting Tichenor’s supposed punctuality and defending the
actions of him and his men.
This thesis attempts to explain what really happened at “Battle Rock,” and why.
Through an examination of these two letters, a picture emerges of a public relations
struggle that ultimately obscured what really happened between the landing party and the
Quatomah. As head of the enterprise, Tichenor attempted to get in front of the blowback
that a massacre of white men in his employ might generate by utilizing Roberts as an
“impartial” witness whose testimony, via the letter, exculpated him of any wrongdoing.
This inadvertently placed Kirkpatrick—who was assumed dead—on the defensive,
compelling him to respond with a courageous narrative justifying the actions of him and
his men. Although not wanting to be alienated from the potential financial rewards of the
Port Orford enterprise, Kirkpatrick fit his account within the parameters established by
Roberts’ letter. In this way, the aftermath helped create the event. The price for this was
historical truth, particularly as it related to the Quatomah. They were not only the victims
of a massacre, but were then cast as villains in a highly-consequential story outside of
their control.
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INTRODUCTION

“Battle Rock” was an 1851 massacre of Quatomah Indians by nine EuroAmerican men attempting to establish the town of Port Orford, Oregon. I first came
across the story in a small volume by J.L. Smith entitled A Chronological History of the
Oregon War: 1850 to 1878, and was struck by the event’s romanticized, larger-than-life
narrative. The Euro-American men had been deposited onto the beach by a San Francisco
steamship captain and land speculator named William Tichenor, who wanted to establish
a coastal supply town that would provide miners and goods to recently discovered gold
fields in the interior. Inhabiting the area where Tichenor intended to build his settlement
were the Quatomah, a small band of Athapaskan-speaking people who were part of a
larger, regional network that historians and anthropologists often classify today as
Tututni. At the time of the landing, however, the Quatomah had been branded by EuroAmericans as “Coast Rogues,” due to their proximity to, and perceived relations with, the
supposedly troublesome and dangerous Indigenous groups living along the lower Rogue
River, roughly thirty miles to the south.
Once Tichenor had transported the men to shore, he assured them the Quatomah
were friendly, and promised he would return in exactly fourteen days with additional men
and supplies. Before he took his leave, however, the appointed leader of the landing
party, a man named J.M. Kirkpatrick, insisted that Tichenor give them the signal cannon
from his ship as protection against what he believed were the “mischievous” looking
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Indians now gathering on the beach.1 Tichenor reluctantly agreed, and the men carried
the cannon up to the top of a large, basalt promontory where they then set up a fortified
encampment. The following morning, according to the traditional narrative, a Quatomah
war party laid siege to the rock, launching arrows and storming up a narrow passageway
to its summit. The men in the landing party, despite being severely outnumbered,
valiantly held off the angry throng by shooting the cannon into their midst, and then
defeating the remaining warriors in brutal, hand-to-hand combat.
When Tichenor finally returned—two days later than he had promised—the
landing party was nowhere to be found. Seeing evidence of a battle on top of the rocky
promontory, he and the others with him searched the area and discovered two discarded
journals, both of which gave insight into what had supposedly transpired. As a result of
these journals, it was assumed the men had either been taken captive or killed by the
Quatomah, and not long after a letter was sent to the editor of a Portland newspaper
giving a suspiciously contrived account of the grim discovery. It had been written by a
San Francisco attorney named D.S. Roberts, who not only claimed that Tichenor had
arrived back at Port Orford on time, but that the landing party had recklessly fled their
fortified camp and were therefore ultimately at fault for whatever had befallen them. The
gripping story quickly went to press and was published under the headline, “Probable
Massacre.”2

J. M. Kirkpatrick, Heroes of Battle Rock, or the Miners’ Reward, Orvil Dodge, ed., (Myrtle Point: 1904),
2.
2
The Weekly Times, July 3, 1851, page 2.
1
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At that same time, 150 miles to the southwest, the nine missing men stumbled out
of the wilderness and into a settlement on the Umpqua River, exhausted but relatively
unharmed. The following day, they read Roberts’ account of their supposed demise in the
newspaper and how they may have acted “foolishly and rashly” by abandoning their
camp prior to Tichenor returning at the appointed time.3 The leader of the group,
Kirkpatrick, was particularly upset by this false claim, and quickly made his way to
Portland where he presented a letter to the Oregon Statesman with his version of events.4
His heroic story, contradicting Tichenor’s supposed punctuality, provided a first-person
account of what happened on top of the rock. Roberts’ letter, despite its refuted details,
was still highly consequential, and it played a fundamental role in how Kirkpatrick
constructed his narrative.
Through an examination of these two letters, a picture emerges of a public
relations struggle that ultimately obscured what really happened between the landing
party and the Quatomah. As head of the enterprise, Tichenor attempted to get in front of
the blowback that a massacre of white men in his employ might generate by utilizing
Roberts as an “impartial” witness whose testimony, via the letter, exculpated him of any
wrongdoing. This inadvertently placed Kirkpatrick—who was assumed dead—on the
defensive, compelling him to respond with a courageous narrative justifying the actions
of him and his men. Although not wanting to be alienated from the potential financial
rewards of the Port Orford enterprise, Kirkpatrick fit his account within the parameters
established by Roberts’ letter. In this way, the aftermath helped create the event. The

3
4

Ibid.
Oregon Statesman, July 15, 1851, page 2.
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price for this was historical truth, particularly as it related to the Quatomah. They were
not only the victims a very real massacre, but were then cast as villains in a highlyconsequential story outside of their control.
In the years immediately following the massacre the two accounts presented by
Roberts and Kirkpatrick coalesced and settled unchallenged into the firm foundation of
accepted truth. In fact, the story seems to have soared to new, even more valorous heights
as the centerpiece of a burgeoning, Euro-American oral tradition in southwestern Oregon.
“Battle Rock,” as it was now being called, was portrayed as a quintessential foundational
tale—the heroic moment when white “civilization” established a bold and determined
foothold in the region. This is evident in one of the earliest written accounts following the
two original letters. In October of 1856, only four years after the massacre, Harper’s
Monthly Magazine published a travelogue entitled “Wild Life in Oregon,” in which
William V. Wells relates the story of Battle Rock as told to him by Port Orford locals.5 In
this version, the nine men in the landing party, who Wells charmingly refers to as “our
little garrison,” heroically faced off against “nearly a thousand braves.”6 After a
harrowing, Thermopylae-like battle, the defeated Indians, despite their overwhelming
numbers, “took to their heels and fled affrighted into the forest.”7 The tale of brave
adventurers repelling a savage horde had taken on a symbolic importance to settlers in the

William V. Wells, “Wild Life in Oregon,” Harper's New Monthly Magazine, Vol.13, (June, 1856), 590;
Wells claims his informant was a member of the landing party. This seems unlikely, however, as the
anonymous individual erroneously states that 18 men were deposited onto the beach.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
5
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region. The rock itself was transformed into a citadel of Anglo-American supremacy,
with the landing party hailed as its “defenders.”8
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, state and regional histories of
Oregon began to appear, one of which was the Pioneer History of Coos and Curry
Counties, published in 1898.9 Written and compiled by a Myrtle Point newspaper editor
named Orvil Dodge, the lengthy text presented various narratives from current and
former residents detailing the region’s history. For the story of Battle Rock, Dodge
tracked down J.M. Kirkpatrick, now in his late-sixties and living in a small mining town
in southern Arizona.10 The statement Kirkpatrick provided in response to Dodge’s inquiry
was the first since his letter to the Oregon Statesman almost four decades prior, and
provides a much more detailed account of the massacre as well as its aftermath. Entitled
“The Hero of Battle Rock,” this second narrative from Kirkpatrick is written in a
sensational, almost jocular style, emphasizing the derring-do of himself and the others in
the landing party. In many ways, it reads like a standard “blood and thunder” story so
popular in dime novels of the day.
In fact, a few years later, Dodge published Kirkpatrick’s narrative again, this time
in dime novel format as a standalone, 21-page promotional booklet for a mining venture
he was involved in.11 Now with the title, The Heroes of Battle Rock, or the Miner’s
Reward, the “short story of thrilling interest” presents Kirkpatrick’s Pioneer History

8

Stephen Dow Beckham, Requiem for a People: The Rogue Indians and the Frontiersmen, (Corvallis:
Oregon State University Press, 1971), 54.
9
Orvil Dodge, Pioneer History of Coos and Curry Counties, (Salem: Capital Printing Co., 1898).
10
Bob Ring, Al Ring, Tallia Pfrimmer Cahoon, Ruby, Arizona: Mining, Mayhem, and Murder, (Tuscon: U.S.
Press & Graphics, 2005), 39-40.
11
Bert Webber, Margie Webber, and J. M. Kirkpatrick, Battle Rock: The Hero's Story: A True Account,
Oregon Coast Indian Attack: An Oregon Documentary, (Medford, Oregon: Webb Research Group, 1992), 7.
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account in its entirety. At the end, however, Dodge subtly connects the narrative to his
mining operation, implying that any potential investors will be continuing the
“adventure” they had read about in the previous pages. It seems that half a century later,
the aggressive commercialism that led to the massacre of the Quatomah on Battle Rock
was now involved in shaping its legacy.
This second narrative given by Kirkpatrick to the exploitative Dodge became the
“official” account of the massacre on Battle Rock, and has since been utilized as the
primary source in everything from 1960s pulp magazines to present-day academic
journals.12 It has also appeared in the two monographs which focus on the so-called
Rogue River War—Stephen Dow Beckham’s Requiem for a People, and The Rogue
River Indian War and Its Aftermath, by E.A. Schwartz.13 In these two works, Battle Rock
is given relatively brief treatment as an adventurous prelude to a larger conflict. This is
also the case in other, more recent works such as Nathan Douthit’s Uncertain Encounters
and The People Are Dancing Again, by Charles Wilkinson.14 The latter text, which is
presented as a “History of the Siletz Tribe,” of which the Quatomah are a part, devotes
only a few hundred words to the event.15 This is not meant to criticize Wilkinson’s very

Joe Beckham, “The Cannon of Battle Rock,” True Frontier, Vol. 1, No. 9, (May, 1969), 20-21, 54-55;
David G. Lewis, and Thomas J. Connelly, “White American Violence on Tribal Peoples on the Oregon
Coast,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 120, No. 4, White Supremacy & Resistance, (Winter 2019), pp. 368381.
13
Beckham, Requiem for a People, 53-59; E. A. Schwartz, The Rogue River Indian War and Its Aftermath,
1850–1980, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 33-39.
14
Nathan Douthit, Uncertain Encounters: Indians and Whites at Peace and War in Southern Oregon, 1820s
to 1860s, (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2002), 116-117; Wilkinson, Charles, The People Are
Dancing Again: The History of the Siletz Tribe of Western Oregon, (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2010), 75-77.
15
Wilkinson, The People Are Dancing Again, 75-77.
12
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fine work, but to emphasize that the massacre has not been given the attention it perhaps
deserves. This thesis seeks to change that.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “anatomy” as the “dissection or dividing
of anything material or immaterial, for the purpose of examining its parts.”16 With this
definition acting as a guiding doctrine, this thesis dissects and examines the earliest
information surrounding the massacre of approximately two dozen Quatomah Indians on
the morning of June 10, 1851, in an effort to arrive, as close as possible, at historical
truth. An eruption of violence, like any other act, does not occur independently inside of a
vacuum. It is part of a chain reaction. The momentary product of diverse, preceding
factors—itself becoming a factor in a subsequent act. Kirkpatrick’s assessment that the
Quatomah seemed “mischevious” was but one of many things which led to the massacre,
and it too was constructed upon a foundation of intertwined, sociocultural elements. One
of these was a distinct bias towards indigenous groups in southwestern Oregon that had
developed steadily over the preceding quarter century. As a result, numerous and diverse
peoples, representing three different language families, were swept up into a crude
conglomeration called the “Rogues.” The Quatomah were one of these people, and in the
first chapter I attempt to paint a picture of who they were by situating them within this
broader, regional context, while also looking at their interactions with Euro-Americans in
the decades prior to the arrival of the landing party.
At the beginning of the second chapter, I shift the focus away from southwestern
Oregon to California in 1849-50, and the massive influx of people seeking to strike it

16

“Anatomy,” The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Accessed February 21, 2021.
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rich. William Tichenor was part of this emigration, and by following his activities in
Gold Rush San Francisco we get a sense of the “speculative craze” gripping the city at
that time. As the easily accessible placer gold in and around the Sacramento Valley began
to disappear, individuals with an eye on commerce turned their attention to the north, and
reports trickling in that gold was being discovered on rivers all the way up into the
Oregon Territory. A loose community of land speculators, seeing this northerly trend,
began mounting expeditions to the still relatively unknown coastline above Cape
Mendocino in search of harbors and rivers where supply towns could be established. If
the location was right, and there really was gold in the interior, in a matter of months a
small settlement might explode into the next great city of the west.
Port Orford was a product of this speculation, and although Tichenor would later
portray the founding of his settlement in the romantic light of Manifest Destiny, as an
attempt to establish a simple homestead for him and his family, in truth it was a collective
business venture involving several different partners from both San Francisco and
Portland. In this way, the Quatomah were not what they have traditionally been made out
to be—a stereotypical horde of aggressive savages fighting against the establishment of
“civilization.” Instead, by pulling back the heavy shroud of settler mythos, the Quatomah
are revealed as the human casualties of a callous commercial enterprise. One not born out
of a “natural” westward expansion along the Oregon Trail, but an encroachment from the
south, in San Francisco, and in the waters just beyond Frederick Jackson Turner’s Pacific
“barrier.”17

Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” The Frontier in
American History, (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1920), 7.
17

8

In the second half of the chapter, I turn to an analysis of the massacre itself,
focusing primarily on the two earliest sources—the letter from D.S. Roberts describing
the discovery of the scene, and Kirkpatrick’s letter in response. As these were composed
days, not decades, after the event, both truth and fabrication are floating closer to the
surface. This is not to say that valuable information cannot be gleaned from later
accounts. In fact, some of the most revealing details come from these sources. However, I
have tried to approach this thesis almost as if it were a criminal investigation, and in that
sense the most reliable witness statements are those taken as close as possible to the event
in question.
In the epilogue, I present what I believed likely happened on top of the rock
leading up to the massacre. While it is impossible to know exactly what occurred, this
alternative theory is at least more plausible than the traditional, attacking horde narrative.
I also look at what transpired in the immediate aftermath when one of Tichenor’s
partners, William Green T’Vault, led an expedition into the interior—with disastrous
results. Finally, I examine the legacy of Battle Rock and its decades-long association with
the Port Orford Fourth of July Jubilee. How and why history is constructed, particularly
in the sense of propaganda, is fascinating, and I see the story of Battle Rock as a
foundational tale fit for the next great city in the west. In this sense, it could be called
boomtown history—a narrative artifact of unmet potential. With that said, the massacre
was a very real event in which two dozen human beings were slaughtered. That is the
story of Battle Rock, and to this day the Port Orford community and the Confederated
Tribes of the Siletz are still debating its legacy.

9

CHAPTER ONE

In the early morning hours of June 9, 1851, the SS Sea Gull emerged from the
darkness off Cape Blanco on the far southern coast of the Oregon Territory. Five days out
of Portland, the small, 200-ton sidewheeler slowly pushed its way through the choppy
waters around a rocky headland, and into the relative calm of a semi-sheltered, southfacing harbor. Dropping anchor a mile offshore, the captain of the vessel, a thirty-sevenyear-old New Jersey native named William Tichenor, stepped out onto the ship’s
weather-beaten deck and peered through his spyglass at the heavily wooded coastline.
Enormous stands of fir, alder, hemlock, and cedar, descended from a mountainous, fogshrouded hinterland to the very edge of a sweeping coastal plain. A two-mile stretch of
rock-strewn beach ran along the rugged, crescent-like contour of the roadstead to its
northernmost point. There, a large basalt promontory sloped out a hundred yards into the
surf like a high, “black wedge” dividing the landscape.18 Scrub brush and wind-bent trees
clung to its summit, some sixty feet above the sand. From around its base, several figures
appeared and looked out at the Sea Gull.19 These were the Quatomah, and they had lived
on that beach for generations.
To them, the big rock was Ma-na-xe oe, and like everything else in the world, it
had emerged eons ago from the flat, watery stillness of Beginning.20 When there were no
swells, no breakers, no wind. Only a single, solitary sweathouse adrift in an endless,

18

George Davidson and U.S. Coast Geodetic Survey, Pacific Coast: Coast Pilot of California, Oregon, and
Washington, Fourth Edition, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889), 375.
19
Kirkpatrick and Dodge, The Heroes of Battle Rock, 2.
20
Lewis and Connolly, “White American Violence on Tribal Peoples on the Oregon Coast,” 370.

10

unmoving fog. Inside the sweathouse was Xowalaci, the creator—breathing, pondering.
Outside, his companion, the watcher—great lover of tobacco—always smoking, always
watching. Then, on one endless, indiscernible day, the watcher saw something strange
approaching. White land. White as snow. Squinting at its starkness, he watched it
undulate outward, north and south, like waves on the ocean. Then, the fog dissipated and
the watcher saw everything in the vastness before him. Wiping tears from his eyes, he
stood, slowly, and walked into the sweathouse. “Xowalaci, are you ready?” he asked.21
Looking up from the fire, the creator smiled at his old friend, took the pipe, and began to
smoke.
Tichenor lowered the spyglass and motioned at his first mate to prep the
whaleboat. A moment later, he was joined on deck by J.M. Kirkpatrick, a brash, twentythree-year-old drifter, who at fifteen had fled the family farm in Ohio and made his way
south to serve as a fifer in the Mexican War.22 Afterwards, he went west, eventually
winding up in the Oregon Country, where he had spent the last year working as a
carpenter in and around the burgeoning town of Portland.23 Two weeks prior, however,
he was recruited to assist Tichenor in establishing a permanent settlement on a remote
stretch of the southern Oregon coast. Kirkpatrick, along with eight other men, were to be
deployed at the proposed site where they would then survey the area and erect a few
preliminary structures. After depositing the men on the beach, Tichenor would continue

Livingston Farrand and Leo J. Frachtenberg, “Shasta and Athapascan Myths from Oregon,” The Journal
of American Folklore, Vol. 28, No. 109 (1915), 224.
22
“Far West Experiences,” Eutaw Wig and Observer, March 22, 1883, Page 1.
23
Kirkpatrick and Dodge, The Heroes of Battle Rock, 1.
21

11

south to his base of operations in San Francisco. There he would gather more men and
supplies before returning in two weeks to what he had decided to call “Port Orford.”
Not long after the expedition had set out from Portland, tension arose onboard the
Sea Gull between Tichenor and the landing party. Although he had promised the group
they would be furnished with arms and ammunition, it was quickly discovered that
weapons were not included in their gear. When confronted, Tichenor brushed off their
concerns, assuring them the Indians in the area were “perfectly friendly.”24 The men were
unconvinced, and when the Sea Gull arrived in Astoria on the following morning they
refused to go any further unless sufficiently armed. Relenting, Tichenor went ashore and
returned a little while later with “three old flint lock muskets, one old sword that was half
eaten with rust and a few pounds of lead and three or four pounds of powder.”25 When
the group commented on the pathetic looking arsenal, Tichenor reiterated that the Indians
were friendly and weapons would not be needed. Kirkpatrick was still not convinced the
group had enough “to fight Indians with,” and before the Sea Gull departed he found a
soldier willing to sell him his rifle for $20.26 This seems to have alleviated his concerns.
Three days later, however, as he and Tichenor stood on deck watching the Quatomah
gathering onshore, Kirkpatrick’s uneasiness returned.
As the men loaded supplies into a whaleboat, Kirkpatrick, recently appointed
“captain” of the landing party, told Tichenor he believed the Quatomah on the beach
“meant mischief.”27 As a result, he wanted to take the Sea Gull’s four-pound signal

24

Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 2.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
25
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cannon as well. Tichenor laughed at this, until he was informed the group would not go
ashore without it, and left with little choice, reluctantly agreed. Later, after the men and
their supplies had been transported to shore, Tichenor bade them farewell and promised
to return in exactly fourteen days. As the Sea Gull slowly left the harbor and continued its
journey south to San Francisco, Kirkpatrick and the others waved at the little steamer
from the beach, and then began carrying their gear up to the top of the rocky promontory.
By the following afternoon, roughly two dozen Quatomah would be dead. To understand
what happened to them and why, it is important to first look at who the they were.
The Quatomah were Athapaskan-speakers, whose ancestors had migrated south
between 1,000 and 1,500 years ago from modern-day British Columbia.28 Also in that
migratory group were the ancestors of the Navajo and Apache, who at some point
branched off towards the American southwest.29 Their once-shared proto-language also
diverged as a result of these migrations into numerous linguistic subgroups—one of
which has been designated by Euro-Americans as “Tututni.” This was a few different
dialects spoken by peoples along a sixty-mile stretch of Pacific coastline, from the area
just below the Coquille River in the north to the Chetco River in the south, and extending
inland along the lower Rogue River perhaps ten or fifteen miles.30 In many ways, it is an
arbitrary construct derived from the name of the largest village in the area, Tututin, and

28

Melvin C. Aikens, Thomas J. Connolly, and Dennis L. Jenkins, Oregon Archaeology, (Corvallis: Oregon
State University Press, 2011), 216-217; John A. Draper, A Proposed Model of Late Prehistoric Settlement
Systems on the Southern Northwest Coast, Coos and Curry Counties, Oregon, PhD Dissertation,
(Washington State University, 1988), 42.
29
Martin P.R. Magne and R. G. Matson. "Moving On: Expanding Perspectives on Athapaskan Migration."
Canadian Journal of Archaeology 34, no. 2 (2010): 227.
30
Joe E. Pierce and James M. Ryherd, "The Status of Athapaskan Research in Oregon," International Journal
of American Linguistics 30, no. 2 (1964): 138; Victor Golla, “Tututni (Oregon Athapaskan),” International
Journal of American Linguistics, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 1976), 217;
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used by anthropologists and treaty negotiators to classify what is thought to have been
seven groups or bands as a single “tribe.”31 As historian Charles Wilkinson points out,
this classification is still useful as these groups not only shared the same language and
geographic area, but also had close socioeconomic ties via trade and intermarriage.32
The Quatomah were the northernmost group within this Tututni framework.33
Their territory stretched from the Sixes River south to Humbug Mountain, and consisted
of three villages, one of which was in the Port Orford area. According to a census
conducted by Indian Agent Josiah L. Parrish, the Quatomah population in 1854 was 98
adults and 45 children.34 This figure was likely 30-40 percent higher before EuroAmerican contact—still making them a relatively small group of people.35 Parrish reports
the principal chief, “Hah-hult-a-lan,” lived in a village along the Sixes, while the subchief, “Tag-on-Ecia,” was in the village at Port Orford. Although these two may not have
held those positions three years earlier when Kirkpatrick and the others arrived on the
beach, the “hierarchy” of villages was likely the same, with the Sixes location being the
main one.
The Quatomah may have spotted and perhaps even interacted with a European
vessel as early as the end of the sixteenth century. Although, it was not until two hundred
years later, at the end of the eighteenth century, that documented encounters first appear

31

Joel V. Berreman, Tribal Distribution in Oregon, Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association,
No. 47, (Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Association, 1937), 31-33; Wilkinson, The People
Are Dancing Again, 13.
32
Ibid.
33
Berreman, Tribal Distribution in Oregon, 31-33.
34
Dodge, Pioneer History of Coos and Curry Counties, 105
35
Douthit, Uncertain Encounters, 6.
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in the historical record.36 One of the earliest occurred in the spring of 1792 when the
HMS Discovery was sailing north on its way to Nootka Sound in modern-day British
Columbia. Following the voyage of Captain James Cook fourteen years prior, word of the
potentially lucrative trade in sea otter pelts had triggered an international rush of
commercial ventures to the Northwest Coast. The British Admiralty, worried their
interests in the region were under threat, mounted a follow-up expedition and gave
command to the late Cook’s protégé, thirty-four-year-old George Vancouver.
On the afternoon of April 24, Vancouver’s “Voyage of Discovery” entered a
small harbor just south of Cape Blanco, which he promptly renamed “Cape Orford” in
honor of a recently deceased friend, George Walpole—the 3rd Earl of Orford.37 In his
journal, he writes that shortly after they anchored a small canoe quickly paddled out to
them and “with the greatest of confidence” pulled alongside his 330-ton warship.38
Onboard the shallow, shovel-nosed vessel sat seven Quatomah men. The Discovery’s
surgeon, Archibald Menzies, was also struck by the outgoing nature of the canoe’s
occupants, writing that they approached “without shewing [sic] any kind of dread or
apprehension,” and when asked if they wanted to come aboard, “accepted very readily of
the invitation.”39

T. C. Elliott, “Captain Robert Gray's First Visit to Oregon,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2
(June, 1928), 168.
37
George Vancouver and Kaye W. Lamb, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and round the
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Clearly, the Quatomah had interacted with a passing ship before. In 1788, an
American merchant sloop had gone by the same stretch of coast on its way north and the
Quatomah had tried, unsuccessfully, to hail the vessel by waving pelts over their heads.40
Just two weeks prior to the arrival of the Discovery they had pulled alongside the passing
Columbia Rediviva to trade “a few Otter and Beaver skins.”41 What is unclear, though, is
if they had ever been invited onboard a ship, and climbing up into that strange, wooden
world would have required a considerable amount of courage. Huddling together on deck,
Menzies writes that the attention of the Quatomah was “much engagd [sic] by other
objects …”42 What were they seeing? The cramped complexity of ropes, barrels, bottles;
men closing in around them; staring, pointing, whispering—some with blond hair, some
with red hair, blue eyes, green eyes, freckles, a silver tooth—men looming in the rigging
above, emerging from hidden spaces below; strange, unfamiliar animals—chickens, pigs,
a cat swirling about their feet; smells, sounds—the ship’s bell, the bleating of a goat—all
of this may have overwhelmed the senses of the seven, mostly naked men. According to
Menzies, they kept “repeating the word Slaghshee the meaning of which we did not
comprehend.”43 An Athabaskan language scholar would later identify that the Quatomah
had been saying “My friends, my friends,” over and over.44
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Both Menzies and Vancouver describe the Quatomah as being generally slender
and short in stature with a light olive or “copper” coloring to their skin.45 Their hair was
long and black and tied neatly in a “club,” either in the back or on the forehead.46 Some
of the sailors were struck by their use of cosmetics—whale oil mixed with red ochre as
face paint, and silica acting as a kind of glitter that was “laid plentifully on the eye brows,
nose and chin.”47 Both their ears and septum were pierced, and in the latter they wore
what was described as a “piece of bone four inches long.”48 This was actually dentalium,
an attractive, tusk-like shell gathered far to the north on what is now Vancouver Island,
and circulated down the coast via trade. The shells were sorted by size and strung
together in groups of ten, with the length of a strand determining its value. Using a bone
needle and charcoal, some Tututni men tattooed their left arm with a series of lines to
measure dentalium from the tip of the hand all the way up to the shoulder if necessary. As
a result of the maritime fur trade, iron and copper items had become more highly-prized
by Indigenous groups on the coast, and Menzies notes that one of the Quatomah quickly
swapped out the dentalium in his nose with a nail he had received in trade.49
As someone who had spent a good portion of his adult life interacting with
indigenous peoples throughout the Pacific world, Vancouver seems to have been
especially taken by the “scrupulous honesty” of the Quatomah bartering system.50 He
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writes that once a deal was struck, if a second bidder offered more than the first “they
would not consent, but made signs … that the first should pay the price of the second, on
which the bargain would be closed.”51 A sailor aboard the Discovery also took notice of
this, writing in his journal that the Quatomah “exercise the strictest honesty.”52
Vancouver relates that at one point he attempted to give them a gift and they “instantly
offered their garments in return, and seemed much astonished … that I chose to decline
them.”53
Not everyone was impressed by the “pleasing and courteous deportment” of the
ship’s visitors, however, and an intriguing aspect of this well-documented encounter is
the way in which individual narratives differ.54 For example, whereas Vancouver and
Menzies both praise the clean appearance of the Quatomah, a midshipman named Joseph
Manby described them as “filthy and stinking,” and “the nastiest race of people under the
sun.”55 He writes in his journal that their faces were so covered with paint it was
“difficult to read their countenances, so much were they disfigured by these odious
fashions.”56 Although Manby’s animosity is the most pronounced, other sailors also refer
to them as dirty, with one even suggesting that the bodies of the Quatomah were “illmade.”57 After interacting with the crew for close to an hour, the Quatomah climbed back
down into their canoe and paddled back to shore.
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It would be twenty-five years before the next documented encounter took place.
During that period—the height of the maritime fur trade—approximately 127 different
vessels visited the Northwest Coast.58 How many of these stopped and interacted with the
Quatomah is unclear. Although, when the British schooner Columbia stopped to trade in
July of 1817, it is apparent their attitude towards Euro-American visitors had changed
considerably. Peter Corney, a sailor onboard the vessel, wrote in his journal that several
canoes cautiously approached around midday “displaying green boughs and white
feathers.”59 At one point they stopped paddling and a man whom Corney took to be a
chief, “stood up, and made a long speech, which we did not understand.”60 After he had
finished the crew of the Columbia waved a white flag and the Quatomah “immediately
pulled for the ship, singing all the way.”61 Once alongside, Corney writes they handed the
emissaries a rope and made signs for them to come aboard, “which nothing could induce
them to do; they seemed quite terrified …”62 Instead, from the safety of their canoes, they
traded furs for beads and knives. They also offered the sailors “berries, fish, and
handsome baskets.”63 Once the trading had finished, the Quatomah “left the ship singing,
and, when they got to a certain distance, made another long speech.”64
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While historian Stephen Dow Beckham has suggested the changed behavior of
the Quatomah was the result of mistreatment by passing ships in the years following
Vancouver’s visit, it seems more likely their cautious, highly-ritualized approach was due
to infectious diseases.65 Smallpox, malaria, measles, influenza, dysentery, whooping
cough, typhus, and typhoid fever were all introduced on the Northwest Coast from EuroAmerican sources in the late eighteenth century.66 Smallpox, in particular, had a
devastating effect on Indigenous groups, and was likely first brought to the coast in 1775
with the Spanish expeditions of Bruno Hezeta and Juan Francisco de la Bodega y
Quadra.67 The first outbreak killed at least one third of the total population, and then
reappeared in a series of successive, epidemic waves that swept away scores of younger
individuals who had not yet developed an immunity.68
In 1811, Chinook Indians along the lower Columbia River discovered the
connection between Euro-American contact and smallpox, and this revelation quickly
traveled up and down the coast to other groups.69 While we can only speculate on how
this affected the Quatomah, historian Greg Dening points out that in the context of South
Pacific islanders, smallpox, despite being linked to Euro-Americans, reinforced cultural
beliefs rather than upturn them.70 They still viewed sickness and death as being caused by
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sorcery or the violation of tapu.71 This also seems to have been the case on the Northwest
Coast, and anthropologist Robert Boyd has argued that indigenous groups created new
myths and rituals to confront these epidemic threats—just as Medieval Europeans did
during the plague years.72 Although the Quatomah may indeed have had one or more bad
experiences with passing ships, the threat of disease is a more likely explanation for the
“speeches” and singing, as well as their refusal to board the Columbia.
Regardless, the encounter reveals that while the Quatomah had adapted to a
changing world they were still a peaceful and outgoing people, willing to engage passing
vessels despite the dangers they may have presented. In this they had some measure of
control, as the watery buffer zone between land and ship allowed them to establish terms
of contact. Although the furs they had to offer were not as desirable as those acquired in
the less temperate climate to the north, their location next to one of the few decent
harbors along the southern coast likely gave them the opportunity to trade with vessels on
a somewhat regular basis—perhaps once or twice a year. By the early 1820s, however,
large scale economic factors as well as the decimation of the sea otter population led to
the decline of the maritime fur trade.73 Ships such as the Columbia, which in earlier years
had cruised the coastline looking for opportunities wherever they arose, now spent their
time in harbors far to the north.
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In the Oregon Country, the fur trade had shifted to a land-based industry
controlled by the Hudson’s Bay Company. Over the next two decades this British-owned
corporation dominated the socioeconomic life of the region—internally designated the
“Columbia Department.”74 While the Treaty of 1818 between the United States and Great
Britain allowed for “Joint Occupancy,” the American presence in the Oregon Country
was insignificant until the 1840s, leaving the HBC to operate as de facto colonial
administrators.75 Their geopolitical maneuvering in response to the threat of U.S.
encroachment on their commercial interests would prove highly detrimental to
indigenous groups south of the Columbia, paving the way for later hostilities between
Euro-American settlers and the so-called “Rogue Indians.”
In 1824, Governor George Simpson, head of North American operations for the
HBC, appointed Dr. John McLoughlin as superintendent of the Columbia Department,
and the following year Fort Vancouver was established as its headquarters.76 Not long
after, McLoughlin, under orders from Simpson, sent a two-pronged expedition south to
explore the lower end of the Oregon Country, and to search for a rumored “Great River”
connecting the Pacific Ocean to the area around the Great Salt Lake.77 Heading the
southeastern branch was thirty-six-year-old Peter Skene Ogden, a stout, “turbulent” man
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who ten years prior had been indicted for brutally murdering an unarmed Cree in northcentral Saskatchewan.78 Ogden avoided prosecution thanks to his then-employer, the
North West Company, who quickly transferred him west “across the mountains.”79
Flanking Ogden on the southwestern, coastal side was the party of 44-year-old
Alexander Roderick McLeod, a tough, somewhat rebellious man who Simpson described
as a “tolerably good Indian Trader, but illiterate self-sufficient and arrogant.”80 While
McLeod and Ogden were both instructed to search for this new river system they had
other objectives as well. A revitalized American fur industry was seen as an increasing
threat to the HBC’s monopoly in the Oregon Country, and Simpson wanted to get as
much out of the region as possible while still in control. He also believed that by trapping
it out and a creating a so-called “fur desert” to the south of their most valuable holdings
along the Columbia River they might create a buffer zone that would forestall American
occupation.81
Ogden’s party, consisting of 58 men and an unknown number of Indian wives and
their children, first went east into “Snake Country,” before heading south to the area
around Klamath Lake.82 From there they traveled down the Klamath River before
crossing over Siskiyou Summit and descending into what is now known as the Rogue
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River Valley in February of 1827.83 This was the first known Euro-American foray into
the region, and the party spent the next two months exploring, trapping, and interacting
with various Indigenous groups. This was generally done via three smaller parties that
went out daily from a central campsite, while a group of men, women, and children
remained behind to dress furs, gather firewood, cook, and guard supplies, among other
things.84
On their second day in the valley an envoy of twenty Shasta Indians visited
Ogden’s camp. His journal entry detailing this encounter reveals a man who was
extremely hostile and suspicious of Indigenous peoples. Dismissing their advice on where
to find beaver as an attempt to lead him and his party astray, Ogden laments these
emissaries “stand not in the least awe of Tradors [sic] or Trappers.”85 In his view, this
was due to “Indians in general” not fearing retribution for their actions, and he states the
HBC should adopt a more aggressive strategy when dealing with them.86 “I am of the
opinion,” he writes, “if on first discovering a strange Tribe a dozen of them were shot it
would be the means of preserving many lives … ”87 Ogden then attempts to reconcile this
brutal notion with his Christian beliefs by arguing the “right to retaliate in kind on all
those who murder” could also be used preemptively.88 “Why allow ourselves to be
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butchered,” he asks, “our property stolen by such vile wretches who are not deserving to
be numbered amongst the living.“89
Despite Ogden’s intense animosity towards the visitors to his camp, the encounter
seems to have ended without incident. Over the next week, however, the aggressive
trapping practices of his party began to anger Indigenous groups in the upper valley, and
he writes they were “displeased at seeing us daily destroy their Beaver and say they will
in consequence starve.”90 After several of the expedition’s horses were shot with arrows
and one of his trappers harassed, a furious Ogden reiterates his belief that “an example
must be made of them …”91 Although his journal never reveals whether he and his men
committed any violence it seems likely that something did in fact occur as Ogden writes
that a delegation came to their camp one evening to sue for peace.92 Afterwards, not only
were there no more reports of harassment, but the peoples they came across fled from
them in fear.93 During Ogden’s initial meeting with the Shasta, he implied that his power
was hamstrung in some way and that this prevented him from preemptively making an
example of Indians. “I wish to God,” he wrote at the time, “the same power and support
the East India Company enjoy were granted to us.”94 This might explain why a violent
incident, if one had occurred, might go undocumented in his journal. Amongst
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colleagues, however, Ogden’s penchant for utilizing “considerable pe[r]suasion” in the
field was well known.95
Ogden’s actions in the Rogue River Valley set the tone for future relations with
cultural groups in the region. This was especially important as it became the main northsouth corridor for Euro-American travel and settlement. As historian Nathan Douthit
points out, the HBC was not interested in establishing fur-trading relationships in the
south.96 They simply wanted to strip it of its commercial appeal to discourage American
advances. “We have convincing proof that the country is a rich preserve of beaver,”
wrote Governor Simpson prior to the expeditions, “and which for political reasons we
should endeavor to destroy as fast as possible.”97 This central objective determined how
Ogden interacted with the Shasta, Takelma, and others, many of whom relied upon
beaver for their survival.98 Perhaps even more consequential were Ogden’s heavily biased
observations of the Indians he encountered, which shaped their reputation as mischievous
and hostile towards whites. This in turn influenced the expectations and actions of
successive expeditions through the valley.
Four days after Ogden’s party left Fort Vancouver the southwestern branch of the
expedition, led by Alexander Roderick McLeod, set out for the coast with “ten men and
an Indian.”99 This number grew as others joined later on, and it does not include what
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was likely its largest contingent—the wives and children of the trappers. Also
accompanying the party was Scottish botanist David Douglas and HBC interpreter
Michel Laframboise, who would later lead expeditions through the Rogue River Valley
into California. Like Ogden, McLeod had orders to acquire as many furs as possible.100
Although, unlike his counterpart to the east, his methods seem to have been much more
tolerant, and throughout the four-month expedition he made a conscious effort to
establish trading relations with groups in the coastal zone.
After setting up a base camp along the lower Umpqua River, McLeod’s party
conducted three exploratory excursions down the coast. In January of 1827, on their third
and final trip, they passed through the Port Orford area on their way south. In his journal,
McLeod reports the Quatomah were alarmed, “for we observed in the course of the day,
several run[n]ing with all their might from us.”101 Eventually, they were able to keep a
small group from fleeing, and he writes that “after their panic was dissipated and a few
presents handed them, they assented to keep us company.”102 The two parties traveled
down the coast together until evening, at which point McLeod and his men gave the
Quatomah a deer they had shot.103 Although not documented, it is possible the two
groups ate a meal together before parting ways.
The following day McLeod’s party arrived at the Rogue River.104 Realizing this
was the “Great River” he and Ogden had been instructed to find, a disappointed McLeod

100

Ibid., xlii, lviii.
Ibid., Appendix C, 204.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
101

27

wrote in his journal that it “falls short of the description report has given it …”105 He and
his party walked along the bank for a while until they came to a small Tututni village,
throwing the inhabitants into a shocked state of confusion.106 After presenting them with
“trinkets,” McLeod was able to learn they “dont trouble themselves about beaver
[sic].”107 Then, in a somewhat surprising move, he and his party decided to set up camp
right next to the village, and that evening their hosts gave them whale blubber to eat.
Although McLeod himself did not partake of any, he writes his men “praised it very
much for its delicacy.”108
Over the next three days McLeod’s party made contact with various Tututni
groups along the lower Rogue. They too had no interest in beaver and instead directed
them east up the river. Perhaps realizing that Ogden was, or would soon be, exploring
that area McLeod decided to head back up the coast. Before leaving, however, his party
discovered that a small hatchet had been stolen from their camp. After detaining several
Tututni, “three Chiefs with about sixty followers made their appearance,” and informed
McLeod the offender had fled.109 As it would be several days before the stolen item could
be recovered, the chiefs instead offered McLeod a hostage, and promised when he came
back to the river the hatchet would be returned to him. Although the hostage, who was
likely a slave, would later flee, this incident highlights the non-confrontational nature of
the Tututni.110
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While McLeod’s exploration of the coast appears to have been less contentious
than Ogden’s foray into the interior of the Rogue River Valley, it was not without its
hostilities. Although coastal groups did not rely on beaver for food or trade, they did have
a strong sense of territorial rights.111 Historian Vernon Nielson points out that boundaries
on the coast were not only rigorously defined and adhered to, but were also passed down
from one generation to the next.112 Villages within those respective boundaries—
identified by prominent headlands, streams, or other geographical landmarks—possessed
the hunting and fishing rights. It appears this was not respected by McLeod’s party as he
was informed at the Coquille River the “Indians grumble at our presumption in trapping
without paying them tribute.”113 He would later dismiss this as hearsay, which indicates
he did not alter his approach.114
There were also two reported incidents of violence on McLeod’s expedition.
Although, the first is somewhat dubious. In early November, the botanist David Douglas
wrote in his journal that one of McLeod’s trappers had returned to camp and informed
him the Indians on the coast “are so hostile, that one of his party has been killed, and an
Indian woman, wife of one of our hunters, with five children, carried off.”115 Douglas
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goes on to say that whatever became of the woman and her children, “we have never
been able to learn.”116 Strangely, this event is never mentioned in McLeod’s journal. One
possibility is that the trapper was having a bit of campfire fun with the botanist, or that
Douglas made up the incident himself to add some dramatic flavoring to his account.
Another possibility is the Indian wife and her children really did disappear, but instead of
being taken they fled back to her people.
The fact that there was no talk of retribution for the trapper’s murdered
companion is also very strange. Particularly in light of the second violent incident that
occurred—this one documented in McLeod’s journal. After returning from their
excursion to the Rogue River he and his party learned one of the expedition’s Iroquois
trappers, Ignace, had been murdered by Coos Indians in retaliation for one of their own
having been shot.117 Apparently, a rifle in the bow of a canoe Ignace and others were in
accidentally discharged, killing the Coos as he was pulling the boat ashore. Fearing for
their safety, Ignace’s companions fled the scene, which made the shooting appear
intentional. As a result, Ignace, who had remained behind with the body, “fell an easy
sacrifice to the irritated Natives.”118 Enraged by this news, McLeod wrote he “would not
suffer the case to pass unnoticed,” and before returning to Fort Vancouver he vowed to
come back at a later date and settle the matter.119
During the following summer, British fears of American penetration into the
Oregon Country were realized when twenty-nine-year-old Jedediah Strong Smith led
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eighteen men and nearly 300 horses up the coast from California.120 Four years prior, the
ambitious New Yorker had taken a fur-trapping party over the Rocky Mountains to the
Snake River country in what is now southern Idaho. There, he and his men encountered
an HBC brigade under the command of Alexander Ross, who foolishly boasted about the
Oregon Country’s productivity to Smith.121 When word of Ross’ blunder reached
Governor Simpson, he promptly demoted the “empty headed” trapper and transferred him
out of the region.122 The damage was already done, though, and over the next few years
Smith led two exploratory expeditions into California before turning north and crossing
the 42nd parallel in June of 1828.123
On the journey north, Smith and his men acquired a reputation for “injudicious
conduct” towards the Indigenous peoples they encountered.124 This information traveled
swiftly up the coast via runners, so that by the time the expedition arrived in the Oregon
Country many villages they came across were empty, the inhabitants having taken refuge
in nearby hills.125 While camped at the Chetco River several of Smith’s horses were shot
with arrows during the night, indicating groups in the area were unhappy that a sizeable,
and undoubtedly very messy, caravan was trampling through their territory.126 On July 1,
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they passed the eventual site of Port Orford. However, no mention is made of the
Quatomah. In fact, that evening Smith wrote in his journal that for many days they had
“hardly got sight of an Indian…”127 Two days later, though, Smith overtook a couple of
scouts near the Coquille River attempting to flee. Realizing they would not be able to
evade a man on horseback, they desperately tried to break apart their canoe to deny its
use before Smith “screamed at them” and they fled north to warn others.128 Not long
after, the expedition was met by a Miluk headman and over a hundred of his warriors on
the dunes near Cape Arago.129 After what must have been a tense few moments in the
wind the two parties came to an understanding and Smith and his men were escorted to a
nearby village to rest, eat, and trade.
A few days later, the Americans continued up the coast, arriving at the mouth of
the Umpqua River on July 11. There, they met the Kalawatsets, who only a year prior had
established trading relations with the McLeod expedition. Historian Gray Whaley
believes this association may have placed Smith and his men in a precarious position, as
the Kalawatsets would have viewed the HBC as allies and the Americans as
interlopers.130 The HBC also made it a point to present themselves as occupants in the
region—not its owners. Smith and his men, however, apparently informed the
Kalawatsets the Oregon Country was the property of the United States.131 The situation
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grew more tense when an ax was stolen from the group and Smith seized the alleged
perpetrator and “put a cord round his neck.”132 A high-ranking Kalawatset stepped
forward and deescalated the situation. Although, he too was later humiliated when he
tried riding a horse for the first time and one of Smith’s men “compelled him to
dismount.”133 The final insult occurred on the evening of July 13 when Harrison Rogers,
a clerk on the expedition, attempted to pull a Kalawatset girl into his tent. When the girl’s
brother stepped in to protect her, Rogers knocked the man to the ground.134
The following morning, while Smith and two others were scouting upriver, the
Kalawatsets attacked, killing 15 members of the expedition. Only one man, Arthur Black,
was able to escape into the woods. He was later found by Tillamook Indians and taken to
Fort Vancouver. Smith and the two men with him were ambushed as they rushed back to
camp. All three survived and were also able to make it to Fort Vancouver, arriving only a
couple of days after Black. In response to the news, Chief Factor McLoughlin instructed
McLeod to lead a punitive expedition against the Kalawatsets, and to recover as much of
the Americans’ goods as possible. While he did not want to damage relations with
Indigenous groups along HBC trading routes, he believed that if he did not seek
retribution it would set a dangerous precedent—even if the attack had been against
commercial adversaries.135
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McLeod and his men traveled to the Umpqua where they interviewed the
headman of a neighboring group who had spoken with the Kalawatsets. Based upon
information gleaned from this conversation, which McLeod determined “carries the
probability of truth,” it was decided that further bloodshed would be unwarranted.136
Although the Americans’ possessions had been widely distributed throughout several
villages in the area, McLeod was successfully able to recover a significant number of
pelts, horses, and other items—all without resorting to violence. Despite this peaceful
conclusion, the stain of the incident lingered as a cautionary tale for decades, and became
a significant chapter in the developing narrative that the Indians of southwestern Oregon
were “the most treacherous of savages.”137
Over the following decade, this sweeping characterization became ingrained as
traffic through southwestern Oregon steadily increased. Smith and his surviving
companions had provided a wealth of first-hand information to McLoughlin regarding
California, which resulted in McLeod being tasked with leading a fur brigade to the
Sacramento Valley.138 This was the first of what became known as the “Southern Party,”
an annual HBC expedition to California that passed through the Rogue River country.
The Indigenous groups in that area had not forgotten the actions of Peter Skene Ogden
and his men two years prior. As a result, they harassed McLeod’s expedition on its way
through by dismantling traps after they had been set. Although this was viewed as simple
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theft, it should be remembered that groups in the valley relied heavily on beaver for food
and trade, and this had been jeopardized by Ogden and the HBC’s attempt to create a “fur
desert” in the region.139
In September of 1833, while leading an expedition through the Rogue River
valley, HBC trapper John Work reported that several horses had been shot with arrows
during the night. “There is no manner of dealing with such barbarians,” he wrote in his
journal, “but to punish them whenever they can be caught.”140 A few days prior, Work
had matter-of-factly referred to the river running through the valley as the “River
Coquin,” the French word for rogue or rascal.141 This is the first documented usage of
that hydronym.142 Although, as historian Lewis O. Saum points out, “rogue” and “rascal”
were common epithets employed by fur traders to describe Indigenous peoples—
particularly those viewed as a hindrance to their commercial endeavors.143 The terms
seem to have also been applied as a kind of cartographic shorthand to areas or features
where these “troublesome” groups lived. For example, two decades prior, Sgt. Patrick
Gass of the Corps of Discovery referred to present-day Baker Bay as “Rogue’s
harbour.”144 After trade was established with the Chinook who lived in the area the name
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fell out of use. This would not be the case with the Rogue River Valley as EuroAmerican trade never really developed in the region.145
The year following Work’s expedition, an HBC party under the command of
Michel Laframboise engaged in a “quarrel” with Indigenous peoples somewhere on the
north side of the Rogue River, killing eleven.146 No one in the HBC party was injured.
Over the next decade Laframboise would lead annual brigades through the valley, and
while details are scant it is generally believed the so-called “Captain of the California
Trail” had no qualms about killing Indians.147 When he was forced to defend the
notorious actions of his employee, McLoughlin stated that Laframboise resorted to
violence only in self-defense, “and in punishing the wrongs others had suffered.”148 This
subjective explanation clothed Laframboise in the guise of “justice,” granting him a
tremendous amount of ethical leeway. Regardless, McLoughlin seems to have been
pleased with the results, at one point boasting that Laframboise had made six trips to
California without losing a man.149 How many Indigenous people were killed during that
span remains unknown.150
In 1834, not long after Laframboise’s party had killed eleven along the Rogue, a
group of Americans led by the well-known trapper and trader Ewing Young arrived at the
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river on their way north to the Willamette Valley. A few months earlier, Young had
agreed to lead an eccentric Bostonian named Hall J. Kelley on a colonizing mission to the
Oregon Country, becoming the vanguard of American settlement in the region. After
setting out from Monterey with seven men and roughly a hundred horses the party was
joined by what Kelley later described as a group of “marauders” leading an additional
fifty to sixty horses, many of which were likely stolen.151 After attaching themselves to
the expedition this villainous contingent proceeded to wreak havoc on Indigenous groups
they encountered, raping and murdering several on the journey north.152 It appears that
Young himself may have been involved in at least one atrocity, leading the naïve Kelley
to speculate that his heroic guide had lost, “some of the refinements of manners once
possessed.”153
When the expedition arrived in the Oregon Country several of its members,
including Kelley, were suffering the effects of malaria. Anthropologist Robert Boyd
makes a compelling argument that it was John Work’s 1833 brigade that was responsible
for carrying the disease, then known as “fever and ague,” south into California where it
then decimated the Sacramento Valley’s Indigenous population.154 It was in that area, on
those “low and pestilential tracts,” that the northbound Young expedition fell ill.155 By
the time they reached the Rogue they were in extremely bad shape, and decided to camp
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on a large island in the river to rest and recuperate, believing this not only offered
protection, but also prevented the horses from wandering off or getting stolen. Not long
after getting situated, two Indians came out to the island to visit and trade. Years later, a
member of the Young expedition would “unburden his troubled conscience” by
confessing to a Methodist missionary that even though the encounter had been friendly,
the group had murdered the two young men to prevent them from telling others they were
in a weakened state.156 After hiding the bodies under rocks and brush, Young, Kelley, and
the others quickly packed up and fled north.
Revenge for the murders was exacted upon another party of Americans passing
through the region the following year. They too had come north from Monterey, and
planned to join Young and the others in the Willamette Valley. After setting up camp
along the Rogue, the group was attacked, resulting in four of their number being killed. A
naturalist named John Kirk Townsend was at Fort Vancouver when one of the survivors
stumbled through the gates, “in a most deplorable condition.”157 The man had been
stabbed several times and had taken a “tomahawk” to the face, cleaving his jaw in two
just below the nose.158 A rattled Townsend would later write that it was “by far the most
horrible looking wound I ever saw.”159 Traders at the fort informed him those responsible
were known as “the ‘rascally Indians,’ from their uniformly evil disposition, and hostility
to white people.”160 By 1835, roughly two years after John Work had referred to a “River
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Coquin,” a stigma was firmly established that Indigenous groups in southwestern Oregon
were collectively more hostile and aggressive.
Over the next several years, a growing demand for livestock in the Willamette
Valley prompted a series of cattle drives from California which passed through
southwestern Oregon, further aggravating tensions in the region.161 The first was led by
Ewing Young and other members of the newly-formed Willamette Cattle Company.
After crossing the Rogue, two of the caravan’s drovers, who happened to be survivors of
the 1835 attack, shot and killed an Indian who had come to their camp to trade. The man
had been accompanied by a young boy, perhaps his son, who was able to escape into the
woods.162 When a member of the expedition, Philip Edwards, protested this “dastardly
act,” he was censured and told they were “not missionaries.”163 Before departing the
scene, Edwards says his companions stripped the dead man of his clothes, “and left him
lying naked.”164 His people later retaliated and managed to wound a member of the
expedition before being driven back.
The following year, settlers in the Willamette Valley started petitioning the
United States Congress for territorial status. In response, advocates in Washington D.C.
began circulating documents extolling the virtues of the Oregon Country while
simultaneously depicting the British-owned Hudson’s Bay Company as tyrannical
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overseers.165 A prominent aspect of this nationalistic propaganda campaign was the
HBC’s mistreatment of Indigenous peoples in southwestern Oregon, and how the
company’s violent “excesses” in the field had placed American settlers traveling through
the region at risk.166 One of the documents presented to Congress was an excerpt from the
journal of Captain Josiah Spaulding, who had transported missionaries to the Oregon
country via ship. In his journal, Spaulding accuses the HBC’s southern party of
committing “every depredation upon the poor defenceless [sic] and peaceful Indians …
murdering hundreds of them every year.”167 He goes on to claim the HBC made it a point
to shoot every Indian they came across south of the Umpqua, “without the slightest
provocation.”168 Despite these exaggerations, there is an element of truth to Spaulding’s
journal, and he does single out Ewing Young—a fellow American—for “cruelties,
barbarities, and murders…”169 In 1843, McLoughlin rebutted Spaulding’s account,
instead implying it was Americans who had committed the most heinous acts.170
Regardless, the stigma surrounding Indigenous groups in southwestern Oregon
continued to shape the expectations and actions of Euro-American settlers throughout the
1840s. Guidebooks, such as the popular Emigrants’ Guide to Oregon and California,
warned travelers of the “extreme hostility and treachery” of Indigenous groups in the

165

Hubert Howe Bancroft and Frances Fuller Victor, History of Oregon, Works, Vol. 29, (San Francisco:
History Company, 1886), 373.
166
John Forsyth and William A. Slacum, “Slacum's Report on Oregon, 1836-7,” The Quarterly of the Oregon
Historical Society, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Jun., 1912), 189.
167
United States Congress, House, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 830, 59.
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
John McLoughlin, E. E. Rich, Kaye W. Lamb, and Hudson's Bay Company, McLoughlin’s Fort
Vancouver Letters, 1839-1844, Hudson's Bay Company Series, Vol. 6, (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1943),
142-148; Douthit, Uncertain Encounters, 54.

40

Rogue Valley.171 This sweeping characterization was also applied to peoples along the
adjacent coastline, such as the Quatomah, who were now being referred to as “Coast
Rogues.”172 While trade with groups in the interior likely made them aware of tensions in
the valley, the Quatomah were still roughly 50 miles from the main Euro-American
thoroughfare. By all accounts, they had very little, if any, contact with outsiders and yet,
unbeknownst to them, they had also been branded as hostile and mischievous.
In 1848, news of the discovery of gold in California led Willamette Valley settlers
to head south in great numbers, further inflaming tensions in the Rogue Valley. It also
brought tens of thousands of people from around the world to the west coast of America,
forever altering the region. Previously sleepy San Francisco exploded almost overnight
into a bustling, international seaport connecting far-flung settlements, such as the
burgeoning Portland, like never before. Although the Quatomah would have had no idea
at the time, this was the very end of their way of life, and over the next two years the
littoral world they had inhabited for centuries, still ill-defined on most maps, would be
violently swept away by a torrent of commercial expansion.
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CHAPTER TWO

Around ten o’clock in the morning on January 24, 1848, on the outskirts of a
Maidu village in present day Coloma, California, a Mexican War veteran and itinerant
carpenter named James Marshall was inspecting the tailrace of a recently constructed
sawmill on the American River when a small, yellow glint caught his eye. Bending low,
he reached into the water and picked up the stone that set in motion one of the largest
mass migrations in American history—the California Gold Rush. Over the next several
years, hundreds of thousands of people were drawn to the heretofore remote Pacific coast
by the glittering possibility of instant wealth. In 1849 alone some 80,000 individuals,
mostly young men, left their homes and families behind and scrambled by land and sea
for the new El Dorado.173 One of these men was William Tichenor.
Born in Newark, New Jersey in 1813, Tichenor spent his youth working onboard
various merchant vessels, first on the Atlantic and later on the Mississippi River. When
he turned twenty, however, he decided to “quit the sea and settle down.”174 In his highlyromanticized memoirs, written just prior to his death in 1887, he depicts the seventeen
years following this decision, when he lived a “life of little action,” as a prolonged
attempt to suppress his true calling—that of the adventurous mariner.175 Despite his
desire to carve out a new path for himself, Tichenor claims the pull of the sea was so
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strong he was forced to move his family inland to get “as far as possible from its
influences.”176 After a few years in Indiana, they moved west across the Wabash River
and settled in Edgar County, Illinois, where he bought a farm and became involved in
local politics, eventually getting elected to the state senate in 1848. By the end of that
same year, though, word of the discovery of gold in California had spread across the
country and Tichenor, like so many others, decided to drop everything and head west. On
February 19, 1849, he resigned his senate seat and “started immediately for the Pacific
coast,” leaving his wife and two young children in the care of a brother.177
On August 3, 1849, Tichenor arrived at the foothills of the Sierra and present-day
Placerville, California—then colorfully known as “Hangtown.”178 He immediately began
mining in the area with some success. Although, the great rush of emigrants, “eager to get
their pile,” soon forced him to ditch his claim and seek out a less crowded locale.179 With
a horse and a mule he made his way east into the rugged and desolate Happy Valley,
where he found nothing at first but “terrible difficulties.”180 Undaunted, he slowly moved
northward while continuing to prospect until one day, on the middle fork of the American
River, he and his animals tumbled down into a deep ravine. It was there, as he lay injured
at the bottom of what came to be known as “Tichenor’s Gulch,” that a certain shimmer
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appeared amidst the dust and the dirt.181 One month later, William Tichenor limped into
San Francisco and bought a schooner for forty-two pounds of gold.182
In 1848, San Francisco was a remote and sleepy village of several hundred
people. One year later, at the end of 1849, it had exploded into a rollicking commercial
hub of some 20,000.183 Hundreds of ships, many of them abandoned and left to rot, lined
the harbor two and three deep. On the Long Wharf, the stench of fish, tar, tobacco and
raw sewage swirled through the waterfront air to a cacophony of brass band music,
auction bells, and a whole host of in-your-face barkers and tooters—some advertising
passage aboard a vessel, others simply creating a distraction while their partner picked a
poor fool’s pocket. Hawk-eyed merchants wielding cowhide whips sold their wares from
open-air stalls as drunken miners with mouths agape stumbled into countless makeshift
groggeries and gambling dens.184 In the words of Mark Twain, gold rush San Francisco
was a “wild, free, disorderly, grotesque society.”185
For Tichenor, newfound wealth in this adventurous new land, free from familial
obligations, finally allowed him to live out his romantic, life-at-sea fantasy, and over the
next several months he immersed himself in the highly-competitive world of Gold Rush
shipping. The in-demand route was transporting miners and freight to and from
Sacramento. Tichenor, however, found this work to be “dull,” and so he turned his
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attention elsewhere.186 The crowded barrooms and meetinghouses of San Francisco
offered up a frenzied buffet of entrepreneurial opportunities—especially to the owner of a
ship. In his popular 1850 work, Eldorado, Bayard Taylor captures the frenetic,
commercial spirit of the city. “You speak to an acquaintance,” he writes, “his eyes send
keen glances on all sides of you; suddenly he catches sight of somebody in the crowd; he
is off, and in the next five minutes has bought up half a cargo, sold a town lot at treble the
sum he gave, and taken a share in some new and imposing speculation.”187 Businessmen,
sweaty and hoarse, shouting in a dozen different languages, scrambled and jostled along
the waterfront, desperate to get their hands on arriving goods—any goods—to sell to the
miners. In some instances, frantically rowing out to approaching ships to buy their cargo
sight unseen.188
In many ways, there were two parallel rushes occurring in California at that
time—the rush for gold, and the rush to sell supplies to those in search of gold. Many
thought the former a foolish endeavor, not unlike playing the lottery. The numbers
generally back this up, particularly starting in the latter half of 1849, as the easy-to-get
placer gold rapidly disappeared. The simple fact was that for every elated boom there
were a thousand catastrophic busts. The only reasonable chance one had to strike it rich
did not involve desperately toiling away in the dirt, but instead “mining the miners.”189
While some sold shovels, pickaxes, and other day-to-day items to the thousands of
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people, brimming with optimism, who poured into the city, others, men like Tichenor, set
their sights on a much larger speculative venture—creating another San Francisco.
These men looked at the bustling metropolis around them, which had exploded
practically overnight into the fourth-ranked U.S. city in foreign trade, and believed the
phenomenon could be replicated at another bay further up the coast.190 Of course, gold
was still the prime factor in this speculation, and the word around town was that it had
been discovered along the Trinity River, 200 miles to the north.191 Many wondered how
far north it could be found. Did it stretch all the way up into the Oregon Territory?
Settlers from the Willamette Valley who had passed through southern Oregon on their
way to the gold fields in California were reporting—now that they knew what to look
for—that the geological conditions around rivers such as the Klamath, Rogue and
Umpqua looked promising.192 Was there another Mother Lode just waiting to be
discovered? How would miners get there, and who would supply them?
These questions are central to understanding what happened to the Quatomah at
Battle Rock, and why. Although the event has been romantically portrayed in the light of
Manifest Destiny, as a heroic attempt by Tichenor and a few other “settlers” to establish a
simple homestead on the remote “frontier” of Oregon, in reality it was a collective,
commercial endeavor born on the teeming, opportunistic streets of Gold Rush San
Francisco. Tichenor and his well-to-do partners were part of a larger effort by various
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entities set on establishing coastal supply towns that paralleled the apparent northerly
trend of gold mining. A settlement in a previously “undiscovered” deep-water harbor, or
at the mouth of a navigable river, could reap a financial windfall as the gatekeeper to a
gold-rich interior. Who knows, if the location was right and the diggings fruitful, in a
year or so it might even rival San Francisco as the next great city in the west. When
viewed in this way, the Quatomah did not represent hostile savagery, but economic
liability.
In his memoir, Tichenor claims his first exploratory expedition to establish a
supply town occurred in the spring of 1850, and was inspired by an old Spanish chart he
had acquired on a recent trip to Mexico. At that time, it was thought that the supposedly
gold-rich Trinity River emptied directly into the Pacific somewhere along the northern
California coastline. While the mouth had yet to be found, Tichenor believed his newlyacquired chart pinpointed its exact location, and he quickly placed an ad in the paper
offering “a short and pleasant trip to the new Eldorado.”193 There was incredible demand
in the city at that time for fresh mining opportunities. Thousands of people, from all over
the world, having read fantastical newspaper stories of abundant gold nuggets effortlessly
plucked from the ground, used whatever funds they could muster to get to California as
quickly as possible. Upon arriving, they were greeted by a much less bounteous reality.
In fact, for many the situation was quite dire as they were now thousands of miles from
home, with little to no money, in an immensely overcrowded, highly-competitive
environment. Tichenor capitalized on the desperation by offering access to a “new,”
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untouched locale, and within moments all eighty-five tickets were sold. On March 23,
Tichenor’s schooner, the Jacob M. Ryerson, sailed through the Golden Gate and headed
north.194
The expedition enjoyed favorable winds for the first few days. Although, that
changed on the afternoon of the 26th, when they ran into a fierce gale off Cape
Mendocino. Unable to land, the crew of the Ryerson battened down the hatches and spent
a long, uneasy night riding out the storm with the rest of the passengers. When dawn
finally broke, Tichenor emerged onto the deck and discovered they had been blown far to
the north and were now thirty miles west of Cape Blanco. Instructing his pilot to stand
along the coast south one degree, he and a few of his men provisioned a whale boat and
pulled for the cape. A mile offshore, they began rowing south while “examining carefully
all indentations, bays, creeks and rivers.”195 Soon, they entered the roadstead that would
eventually become Port Orford. Seeing it for the first time, Tichenor claimed he wanted
to go ashore but the “numerous naked savages and their hostile appearance” prevented
him.196 This remark, written nearly forty years after the fact, is likely nothing more than a
dramatic embellishment. Still, it is possible that Tichenor and the whale boat crew, upon
seeing the Quatomah, felt vulnerable in their smaller vessel and decided to flee.
After rejoining the Ryerson on the following afternoon near present-day Crescent
City, Tichenor and the rest of the expedition continued south to explore the coastline. Just
below Trinidad Head it was discovered the “Trinity River” on Tichenor’s Spanish chart
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was in fact the Eel River.197 The actual Trinity was inland about 40 miles. Despite this
setback, the Ryerson’s passengers decided they wanted to stay and settle the area around
Humboldt Bay, eventually founding the towns of Arcata and Eureka. Incidentally, some
onboard the vessel were members of the notorious “Sonoma Gang,” vigilantes who had
recently slaughtered dozens of Native Americans around Clear Lake.198 The gang had
been arrested and held onboard the USS Savannah in San Francisco Bay, only to be
released on a $10,000 bond following the first ever decision by the California Supreme
Court.199 Although ordered to appear at a later date to stand trial for murder the gang
jumped bail and fled north aboard the Ryerson. Tichenor seems to have been well aware
of this, and in his memoirs he states the gang’s members were “fine specimens of
Western manhood.”200 Why he himself did not stay in the area is unclear. Perhaps there
were too many settlers involved. Or perhaps his earlier “discovery” of the Port Orford
area had convinced him it was a better place for his supply town—despite the supposedly
hostile “savages.”
Over the next few months, the success of the new towns around Humboldt Bay
created an excitement amongst the horde of eager speculators in San Francisco, and
several joint stock companies soon formed with the intention of establishing their own
settlements.201 One of these, Winchester, Paine and Company—also known as the

197

Ibid., 5.
Jerry Rohde, “The Sonoma Gang: Remembering the Genocidal Scum Who Built Arcata,” North Coast
Journal, September 11, 2008.
199
Barry Evans, “Ben Kelsey: Arcata Founding Father, Trail Builder, Indian Killer,” North Coast Journal,
February 13, 2014.
200
Tichenor, Reminiscences, 7.
201
Caspar T. Hopkins, “The California Recollections of Caspar T. Hopkins,” California Historical Society
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1946), 110.
198

49

Klamath Exploring Expedition—set their sights on the southern coast of the Oregon
Territory.202 Handbills fluttered through the streets of San Francisco calling on shrewd
and adventurous investors to join an exciting “voyage of discovery.”203 A share in the
endeavor cost $100, but for $50 extra individuals could have the “privilege of
accompanying the expedition” to the mouth of the Klamath River.204 Once there, the
company planned to “take possession of the most eligible townsites,” which would then
be surveyed into lots and divided amongst the shareholders.205 Those who went would
not only be able to choose the most desirable lots, they could also take advantage of what
was arguably the most generous land distribution bill in United States history—the
Donation Land Claim Act—which granted each white, male emigrant to the Oregon
Territory 320 acres of land. If married, the settler’s wife also received 320 acres for a
grand total of 640 acres, or one square mile. As historian Kenneth Coleman points out,
the DLCA allowed settlers to seize indigenous lands without consent, even though the
Constitution recognized tribal groups as the legal equivalent of sovereign nations.206
On July 5, 1850, thirty-five Winchester, Paine and Company shareholders,
“armed to the teeth,” sailed out of San Francisco Bay onboard the schooner Samuel
Roberts.207 Prior to leaving, some of the men had gathered “half a ton of old screws,
hinges, and nails” from a burnt-down hardware store to use as ammunition in the ship’s

Hopkins, “California Recollections,” 110.
Ibid.
204
Ibid.
205
Ibid.
206
Kenneth Coleman, “’We’ll All Start Even’: White Egalitarianism and the Oregon Donation Land Claim
Act,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 120, no. 4 (2019): 416.
207
Socrates Scholfield, “The Klamath Exploring Expedition, 1850: Settlement of the Umpqua Valley—Its
Outcome,” The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1916), 342; Hopkins,
“California Recollections,” 111.
202
203

50

four-pound carronade.208 They also brought a dozen muskets and “small arms to each
man’s taste.” In many ways, while it may not fit the conventional definition, this was a
filibustering expedition—at least in spirit. Prior to the Civil War the term “filibuster”
carried a much different connotation than it does today. Back then it referred to an
unauthorized, private military invasion of a foreign country or territory that was officially
at peace with the United States. In the aftermath of the Mexican War filibustering
reached “epidemic” proportions in America with numerous expeditions taking place
throughout the 1850s.209 Perhaps the most well-known example was the campaign of
William Walker, the so-called “Gray-eyed man of destiny,” who conquered Nicaragua in
1856.210 Although the Klamath Expedition was not invading a foreign country, and the
Donation Land Claim Act implicitly “authorized” their actions, they were still
aggressively taking land from peoples they did not view as Americans, and who the
Constitution recognized as a sovereign nation. In fact, one of the men later joked that it
was a good thing the federal government was not yet in California “else had our piratical
appearance stamped us at once with the character of filibusters.”211
After a rough, fourteen days of sailing into a strong headwind the expedition
reached what they thought was the Klamath River, but in actuality was the Rogue.
Crowding onto the deck the men spotted “several Indian houses” onshore, and decided to
sound the river’s entrance before attempting to cross it in the Samuel Roberts.212 Six
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sailors shoved off in a whaleboat and slowly pulled their way through the choppy, roiling
waters of the bar. Suddenly, a heavy breaker slammed into the smaller vessel, capsizing
it. The men onboard the Roberts, many of whom had spent very little time at sea,
watched in horror as the sailors were thrown overboard and quickly “swallowed up by the
waves.”213 After several tense moments of pointing and peering through the churning
mist, four of the six sailors were spotted being pulled from the surf by the excited Tututni
lining the shore. The “dreadfully mutilated” bodies of the other two men would be found
a couple of days later, washed up onto the beach.214
Concerned about the safety of his sailors, the young captain of the Samuel
Roberts, Albert Lyman, recklessly attempted to take the undermanned schooner across
the bar by himself, leading one member of the expedition to later write “there were but
two able seamen left on the vessel, of whom the captain, unfortunately was not one.”215
During the first attempt the foresail crashed onto the deck and the ship came dangerously
close to running aground “broad-side on.”216 Eventually, on the second try, Lyman was
able to maneuver the schooner safely through, leading to an “exultant shout” from all
onboard.217 This was answered by loud cheers from the riveted Tututni spectators on the
beach, who, to the surprise of many onboard the Roberts, quickly loaded the rescued
sailors into their canoes and paddled out to greet the vessel.
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The subsequent interaction between the two parties was documented by several
different individuals. The only account that seems to have reached a significant audience,
however, was written by one of the expedition’s organizers, C.T. Hopkins, and published
a few years later in a California magazine. Hopkins’ narrative would eventually be the
primary source used by ghostwriter Frances Fuller Victor in Hubert Howe Bancroft’s
widely-read History of Oregon.218 As Hopkins account was intended for public
consumption it is highly exaggerated and biased, depicting the “Rogue Indians” they
encountered as goofy, subhuman creatures “with an expression of face indicating an
inveterate habit of duplicity.”219 Hopkins writes the survivors of the whaleboat “owed
their safety to the rapacity of the Indians,” who he claimed rescued the men simply to
steal their belongings.220 Writing decades later, Fuller Victor added her own dramatic
touches to Hopkins’ account, stating the sailors were stripped of their clothing and were
“naked and half dead with cold and exhaustion, being freely handled by their captors.”221
While it appears the Tututni did in fact take some of the wet clothing off of the
sailors they rescued, they likely did this to help the men get warm, and two different
accounts mention the clothing being returned.222 This is not to say that the Tututni did not
help themselves to certain items in the men’s possession, but it was not the aggressive
“robbery” that Hopkins and Fuller Victor make it out to be.223 In fact, another member of

218

Bancroft and Victor, History of Oregon, 177.
C.T.H., “Explorations in Oregon,” 350.
220
Hopkins, “California Recollections,” 112.
221
Bancroft and Fuller Victor, History of Oregon, 177.
222
C.T. Ward, “An Exploring Expedition in 1850,” The Overland Monthly, Vol. 17, No. 101, (May, 1891),
477; Albert Lyman, The Journal of Captain Albert Lyman, MS, 1850-51, Transcribed from Microfilm,
Douglas County Museum, 10.
223
C.T.H., “Explorations in Oregon,” 286.
219

53

the expedition later wrote that “a few trifling things were stolen, but no account was
taken of them.”224 Although Hopkins goes on to describe hundreds of Tututni
“surrounding the vessel in swarms” and attempting to steal everything in sight, in reality
only about twenty paddled out to the Roberts.225 Once alongside, they remained in their
canoes and “a brisk trade soon sprung up,” with the Tututni offering the men bows,
arrows, pelts, baskets of mussels, fish, berries, and other goods.226 In exchange, members
of the expedition gave the Tututni old shirts, nails, cutlery, and other bits of metal they
had picked up from the burnt-down hardware store in San Francisco.227
On the following morning, the expedition sent out three parties in different
directions to search for promising townsites. One eight-man group, led by surveyor
Nathan Scholfield, headed north along the beach with the intention of hiking all the way
to Cape Blanco. This would take them directly through the future site of Port Orford,
roughly seven miles south of the cape. After about four miles of trudging through sand,
six members of the group decided to move up to the less arduous coastal terrace above,
leaving only Scholfield and a gentleman named Helbert on the beach. Although they
planned to reconvene a short distance up the coast, the two groups quickly lost track of
each other and Scholfield and Helbert found themselves traveling alone amidst an
increasing number of curious Tututni. Scholfield’s son, who was also a member of the
expedition, provides a remarkable account of his father’s experience, offering an
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important glimpse of the peoples living just to the south of the Quatomah—only months
prior to the arrival of Tichenor’s landing party.228
Scholfield, realizing that he and Helbert were now on their own, insisted that they
keep moving forward as confidently as possible despite the numerous Tututni gathering
around them. As they continued up the beach, more and more came out of the woods to
join the procession and the two men tried to “show no fear” by smiling and shaking hands
with each.229 Nearing a Tututni village, a headman and several of his warriors seated
themselves in a row in the sand, waiting for the two men to approach.230 Clearly, they
were interested in communicating and trading with these visitors to their territory. After
quickly shaking hands, though, Scholfield and Helbert inexplicably continued straight
past them. Upset by the slight, the Tututni in the procession tried unsuccessfully to get
the men to go back and sit down, but the two kept moving forward. After a short distance,
the crowd, which now numbered close to a hundred, started physically pressing in on the
two men, forcing them to stop and sit down on a large log.
The men offered up some of their provisions, including ham, pilot bread, and
biscuits. The Tututni were more interested in their gear, though, and within moments a
hatchet went missing. After asking for it back and not getting a response, Scholfield, to
the horror of Helbert, drew his revolver and demanded “that all who had any skins or
dress of any kind, by means of which it could be secreted, to take them off and exhibit
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them.”231 Remarkably, many of the Tututni, despite being “armed with bows and arrows,
knives, rifles, etc.” took off their skins and allowed Scholfield to search them, “although
in some cases reluctantly.”232 Needless to say, Helbert was “filled with fear and
consternation during this procedure.”233 Not only did his companion apparently have a
death wish, but the Tututni back at the Rogue had informed him that if he went too far up
the beach there was a good chance his beard would be yanked out. Even if they were
simply pulling his leg it was not something he was particularly interested in confirming,
and so he strongly urged they turn back.234 Scholfield, however, was insistent they
continue forward and with his revolver in hand he cleared a path through the surrounding
throng.
The pilfering done by the Tututni in this situation should not be viewed as theft in
a Euro-American context. Greed was not the driving factor, but rather prestige. In some
ways, it seems to have been a variation on the act of counting coup, a highly-ritualized,
graded system of honors amongst Plains Indians that emphasized, among other things,
touching an enemy with a bow or coup-stick, taking their weapon in battle, or capturing a
horse.235 The sly and skillful acquisition of an item, such as a hatchet, was recognized by
the perpetrator’s peers, granting that individual status. If the Tututni had simply wanted
Scholfield and Helbert’s possessions they would have forcefully stripped them naked in a
matter of moments. Instead, although outnumbering the men fifty to one, they relied on
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guile to obtain certain items. For example, while Scholfield was conducting his search for
the hatchet he noticed a Tututni “coming up behind him with his knife to cut the strap
which bound his blankets to his back.”236 This clandestine act was not necessitated by a
fear of being caught, it was a performative display of skill.
Individual honor, however, was only one aspect of this cultural phenomenon. In
analyzing the relationship between the Lewis and Clark Expedition and Indigenous
groups along the Columbia, historian James P. Ronda argues that the constant theft of the
explorers’ supplies involved two patterns of behavior.237 The first was the belief that any
items taken were proper payment for services rendered. After all, the Indians had
provided invaluable support to the expedition in both information and physical labor.
This might explain why the Tututni at the mouth of the Rogue had taken a few items
from the sailors they had rescued—they viewed it as payment for saving their lives. The
second pattern of behavior, according to Ronda, moves beyond transactional reciprocity
to the more complex idea of respect. By taking a knife here and a blanket there they were
reminding the Corps of Discovery they needed to acknowledge the importance of the
peoples whose land they were moving through. Anthropologist David H. French likens
this to the application of pressure, the purpose of which was to reestablish mutually
beneficial relations.238 Although Scholfield and Helbert were interacting with different
peoples, decades later, it is interesting that the hatchet was taken only after they had
disrespectfully walked past the seated headman and his warriors. This concept of respect
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and the establishment of mutually beneficial relations would play a crucial role in what
eventually transpired at Battle Rock.
With the crowd now following Scholfield and Helbert “at a more respectful
distance,” the two men continued to make their way up the beach.239 According to a
much later account given by Scholfield’s son, the Tututni they began to encounter
seemed more forbidding than those to the south and were “too savage for pleasant
society.”240 Even though it was thought their goal, Cape Blanco, was “only about a mile
further on,” they decided it was too dangerous to keep going forward and turned back.241
The claim that the Tututni in this area were more hostile seems suspect, and may have
been a later embellishment based on the belief the men were getting close to the future
site of Port Orford and Battle Rock.242 In truth, they never made it that far north, as that
would have meant they had traveled roughly 30 miles in half a day. Scholfield’s son
mentions that they had gone a little over eight miles “from the vessel” when the Tututni
took the hatchet.243 This would have placed them a few miles south of present-day Sisters
Rock, which seems to have been mistaken for Cape Blanco—still 20 miles to the north.
This also lines up with C.T. Hopkins’ account which states that Scholfield’s party was
“stopped ten miles out by a gathering crowd of threatening Indians.”244
Soon after Scholfield and Helbert made the decision to turn back they ran into the
rest of their party coming up the beach. After warning the others of the dangers in the
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area, Scholfield decided it would be safer if the entire group traveled back to the Rogue
on the coastal terrace. To get up there, though, they would need to pass by another village
where many of the supposedly hostile-looking Tututni had gathered. As the group passed
by them, Scholfield’s son writes the “Indians came out and arranged themselves in a row,
or rather in the segment of a circle on their knees, with their bows and arrows and other
weapons ready for use.”245 Again, judging by the description it seems the Tutuni simply
wanted the men to stop, sit down and trade—perhaps completing the half-circle they had
already formed. After saluting them “in a friendly manner,” however, Scholfield and the
others hurried past.
Despite fears of an ambush on their return trip, Scholfield’s party made it safely
back to the ship “without molestation.”246 Once there, they learned the other parties had
all come back unharmed as well. Everyone onboard was particularly surprised by this,
with Hopkins writing that the Tututni “never harmed a hair of our heads!”247 Despite this,
it was determined the Rogue River area was unsuitable for a supply town. That evening a
“council of war” was held aboard the Roberts, and although some of the shareholders
wanted to return to San Francisco they were outvoted by the majority who wanted to sail
north up the coast to explore the Umpqua River.248 After being forced to wait several
more days for a favorable wind, on July 30, 1850, the expedition left the Rogue and
pushed back out into the Pacific. As the Roberts sailed north into the distance, the men on
deck jokingly waved handkerchiefs at the Tututni gathered along the shore. “Good
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by[sic], thou paradise of rogues,” Hopkins exclaimed. “Not one on board the Samuel
Roberts will ever desire to visit thee again!”249
Five days later, on August 4, the Roberts made it across the equally treacherous
Umpqua bar and anchored in a small bay just inside the river’s mouth. Several
Kalawatsets in a canoe had provided assistance in piloting the schooner, and some of the
men remarked that they “appeared to have a more respectable bearing” than the Tututni
along the Rogue.250 They also “did not display a propensity to steal” and were therefore
allowed to come aboard the ship.251 Capt. Lyman attributed this to the Kalawatsets
having had a lengthy trading relationship with the Hudson’s Bay Company, whose Fort
Umpqua was located roughly fifty miles upriver.252 It is unlikely anyone onboard the
Roberts knew it was the Kalawatsets who, 22 years earlier, had massacred Jedediah
Smith’s party.
Celebrating their safe arrival on “one of the most beautiful sheets of water on the
Pacific Coast,” the men onboard the Roberts fired the ship’s cannon and shot off their
muskets in the “wildest exultation.”253 This got the attention of three “Oregon pioneers”
who had journeyed from the interior on a surveying expedition.254 One of the men, Levi
Scott, had established a claim 26 miles upriver—Scottsburg—in the hopes that it would
serve as a supply town and mail depot for southern Oregon. Scott and his partners had
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traveled down to the Umpqua’s mouth to test its navigability and to discover what sort of
harbor it had.255
After providing the members of Winfield, Paine and Company with information
on the region, Scott and his companions eagerly joined forces with the well-connected
San Franciscans, merging their formerly separate enterprises into the all-new Umpqua
Townsite and Colonization Company. Over the next three weeks they laid out several
new settlements, including Umpqua City and West Umpqua near the river’s mouth, as
well as Elkton and Winchester in the interior.256 With the previously established
Scottsburg, this brought the total number of settlements to five. A gleeful Hopkins
estimated that all together this equaled 15,000 town lots at a cost to shareholders of
only .60 cents per lot. “How could we fail to get rich on such a layout as that,” he
remarked.257 With their claims in place, a majority of the investors quickly returned to
San Francisco to begin a marketing campaign promoting the new settlements.
Unfortunately for Hopkins and his partners, when the much anticipated Donation
Land Claim Act passed into law in September of 1850 there was a clause preventing
companies or non-residents from holding lands for the purpose of speculation. This
essentially ended the enterprise, and “beaten, ‘bursted’ and burdened with debt,” the San
Francisco contingent of the Umpqua Townsite and Colonization company quickly
dissolved.258 “Within five months of the sailing of the Samuel Roberts,” Hopkins writes,
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“not a man of those who returned in her, was in any manner interested in the Umpqua
Country.”259 Those who had remained behind continued to develop the region, though,
and prior to the enactment of the DLCA, the Kate Heath, a brig carrying milling
machinery and a number of zinc houses, as well as seventy-five immigrants, left San
Francisco to settle in the new towns.260 These individuals, many of whom had mistakenly
purchased a lot, were now, for better or worse, committed to building a life there.
Despite the commercial failure of Winfield, Paine and Company, the endeavor
kick-started Euro-American “settlement” of southwestern Oregon. In this way, it was an
important precursor to the events at Battle Rock. In fact, according to a man named
George Cole, the first mate of the resupply vessel, Kate Heath, was none other than
William Tichenor.261 How he came to work onboard the ship is unclear as Tichenor never
mentions it in his memoirs. He does state that after helping to establish the supply towns
around Humboldt Bay he had returned to San Francisco and sold the Jacob M.
Ryerson.262 While he does not give a reason for parting with his schooner, like many
other ship captains during the Gold Rush, he may have had difficulty maintaining a crew.
As the drive to establish supply towns was now in full swing, Tichenor likely took the job
onboard the Kate Heath as a means of scouting the area and seeing the new settlements
along the Umpqua for himself, particularly Scottsburg, which due to its ideal location at
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the head of navigation, had quickly become an important waystation and supply depot for
the interior.263
Tichenor’s memoir implies that by the time he took the job as first mate onboard
the Kate Heath he was already formulating his plan to establish a supply town at Port
Orford. If this is the case he would have undoubtedly viewed the Scottsburg enterprise in
a competitive light. A significant drawback to its long-term viability as a coastal supply
town was the need for ships to cross the hazardous Umpqua bar. In fact, by the time
Tichenor arrived in the area it had already claimed one vessel, the Bostonian, and few
weeks later almost caused the sinking of the departing Kate Heath.264 Understanding that
the Port Orford site, having no bar to cross, held a distinct advantage over riverine
Scottsburg, Tichenor traveled back to San Francisco with a strong pitch for potential
backers.
Perhaps the most significant maritime entity in San Francisco at that time was the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company. Three years prior, in 1847, the U.S. Postmaster
General, working with the Secretary of the Navy, authorized a subsidy for the
establishment of mail service to the Pacific coast. Naval appropriations required that any
steamers involved in the commercial enterprise be made available to the government in
times of war.265 After a period of bidding, the U.S. Mail Steamship Company was
awarded the coveted first leg of service, from New York to the Isthmus of Panama. The

263

A.G. Walling, History of Southern Oregon, (Portland: A.G. Walling, 1884), 435.
Isaac J. Wistar, The Autobiography of Isaac Jones Wistar, 1827-1905, (Philadelphia: The Wistar Institute
of Anatomy and Biology, 1914), 286.
265
John Haskell Kemble, A Hundred Years of the Pacific Mail, Mariners' Museum Publication, No. 19,
(Newport News, Virginia: Mariners' Museum, 1950), 6.
264

63

second leg, from Panama to the Oregon Territory, was given to the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company, owned by William Henry Aspinwall. Although California had only
recently come under U.S. control, and the population of Oregon was small at that time,
Aspinwall saw the long-term potential of shipping on the Pacific.
Needless to say, the California Gold Rush accelerated Aspinwall’s plans
considerably and the company was forced to subcontract steamers to handle the mass of
people and goods now traveling up and down the Pacific coast. One of these vessels was
the steamship Seagull, which Tichenor took command of in March of 1851, after which
he was “immediately put on the rout of the Columbia River and intermediate ports.”266
Unsurprisingly, the Umpqua bar soon became a point of contention with Pacific Mail,
and they began actively seeking a new, less treacherous point of distribution for southern
Oregon.267 Although never explicitly stated, it seems fairly obvious that Tichenor was the
driving force behind this development, and it would be naïve to think he was simply
acting as a good company man and was not motivated by his own personal agenda—the
establishment of a supply town 75 miles south of the Umpqua at Port Orford. From there,
Tichenor believed he and his partners could easily clear out a road to link up with the
gold mines in the interior. In this way, he would, quite literally, undercut the competition
in Scottsburg.
In his memoir, Tichenor portrays his “discovery” of the Port Orford area in a
romantic, individualistic light—claiming he simply wanted to establish a “permanent
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residence” for himself and his family.268 In truth, it was a joint venture involving the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, as well as several high-profile individuals in both
Oregon and California, including T. Butler King, chief tax collector for the Port of San
Francisco, and William T’Vault, Oregon’s first postmaster-general, among others.269
Although postal delivery to southern Oregon may have been the impetus behind the
project, the primary incentive for Tichenor and his partners was connecting the town to
the gold diggings in the interior. In late-May of 1851, after delivering the mail to
Portland, Tichenor recruited Kirkpatrick and the other members of the landing party and
deposited them at the Port Orford site on his way back down the coast. Although they
were not given payment up front, each of the men had been promised “a share in the
town” if they spent two weeks on site, laying the groundwork.270 As the Sea Gull slowly
pushed its way out of the harbor, Tichenor stood on deck and waved back at Kirkpatrick
and the other men before they began carrying their supplies up the large, rocky
promontory.271 The Quatomah, who at first had wanted to trade with the men, now
simply stood watching from several yards away.272 As the steamer made its way down
the coast towards San Francisco, the scene on the beach retreated further and further into
the distance until all of the figures around the large, black rock, both Indian and white,
had become dark and indiscernible.
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A few days later, after arriving back in San Francisco, the Sea Gull was seized by
creditors, which ultimately prevented Tichenor from returning to Port Orford on time.273
The details of this incident are unclear. He never mentions it in his memoirs, instead
claiming he “found it necessary to repair and paint the ship.”274 This clumsy explanation
does not mesh logistically with his obligation to the landing party, and the fact he wrote it
thirty-five years later reveals much about his sense of pride.275 In Among the Oregon
Indians, he briefly mentions that the Sea Gull “belonged to Austens & Spicer,” prominent
commission merchants out of New York.276 In March of 1851, three months prior to the
Sea Gull being seized, Austens & Spicer went under with over a million dollars in
liabilities.277 These two incidents may have been related. Although, if Tichenor was
simply the victim of another party’s poor business practices, he certainly would have
stated this in his memoirs. Whatever the case may be, he was suddenly unable to get back
to Port Orford. In response, the Pacific Mail SS Co. arranged for Tichenor’s passage
aboard the steamship Columbia, which was making its regularly scheduled run up the
coast. Whether it was due to his financial difficulties, or a lack of space onboard the ship,
Tichenor was only able to bring two other men with him to augment the landing party.278
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On June 21, the Columbia set out on its journey north, stopping twice at
Humboldt and Trinidad before arriving at the Port Orford site.279 A detailed account of
the subsequent landing and investigation of the area by Tichenor and others onboard the
ship was provided to an Oregon newspaper by a San Francisco attorney named D.S.
Roberts, who identifies himself as being the “purser of the steamship Columbia.”280
Outside of a few remarks made by Tichenor in his memoirs, Roberts’ account of what
was discovered that day is the only one known to exist. It is an interesting document, rife
with inconsistencies as well as a noticeable bias in its tone. It certainly does not read as if
it were the observations of an impartial witness. Instead, it seems to have been
constructed to absolve Tichenor, and perhaps more importantly the Pacific Mail SS Co.,
of any negligence or wrongdoing.
Roberts begins the letter by stating he is providing details of the “sad transaction,”
to place residents of the Oregon Territory on their guard as to the “nature and disposition
of the Indians…”281 After giving background information on the Port Orford enterprise,
he says it was selected as the location for a settlement because it has a “better harbor than
either Trinidad or Humboldt.”282 This not-so-subtle endorsement is followed by a
description of Tichenor’s “well-armed and provisioned” landing party, as well as their
orders to “deal carefully with the Indians.”283 Of course, this directly contradicts
Kirkpatrick’s account of he and the other men raising concerns about their lack of arms
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and ammunition, as well as Tichenor’s response that the Quatomah were “perfectly
friendly.”284
Roberts then explains how the Pacific Mail SS Co. had offered Tichenor and the
“two others who were with him” passage aboard the Columbia as it made its way up the
coast.285 This statement is framed in such a way as to distance the company from the Port
Orford enterprise by implying they were simply providing transportation. Roberts also
stresses that the Columbia arrived at Port Orford on June 23, “the very day set by Capt.
Tichenor for his return.”286 This emphasis on establishing punctuality is suspiciously
forced in Roberts’ letter. Kirkpatrick later refutes this by stating the landing party did not
abandon the rocky promontory until the evening of the 24th.287 Since Roberts claims that
they “came in sight of Port Orford at 9’oclock in the morning,” this would make the
Columbia’s earliest possible arrival June 25th, four days after beginning its journey
north.288 This timeframe is corroborated by the Daily Alta California, which indicated it
had taken the Sea Gull four days to travel south from Port Orford to San Francisco.289
According to Roberts, as soon as the Columbia arrived at Port Orford they spotted
smoke from a campfire at the base of the rocky promontory, which made them believe
“the men were all safe and waiting for the arrival of the steamer.”290 After the ship
dropped anchor, however, someone noticed three Indians running away from the
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promontory and down the beach to the south. Three more were spotted in a canoe,
“pulling with all speed in the same direction.”291 The men onboard the Columbia decided
to fire off the ship’s signal cannon to announce their arrival and to see “what effect the
sound of it would produce on the Indians in the canoe.”292 Roberts writes the blast caused
them to fall flat, “as if through fear,” before they hurriedly paddled to shore, jumped out,
and disappeared into the woods.293
After waiting several minutes without any sign of the landing party it was decided
that a group should go ashore to investigate, and a whale boat containing “Capt. LeRoy,
Capt. Tichenor, Mr. Catherwood, and six or eight others” set out for the beach.294
Interestingly, Roberts does not include himself in the list of people going as one would
normally do. It might simply be an oversight as he does say “we” quite frequently. At the
same time, though, not once does he use first person singular in his letter, which is odd
considering it is supposedly an account of his own observations. This suggests he may
not have actually gone ashore and instead the letter was composed in collaboration with
someone who did—most likely Tichenor.
After the group landed on the beach, Roberts says the first thing they noticed was
a large amount of pilot bread, several books, and an assortment of carpenter tools strewn
about the sand. They quickly made their way up to the top of the rocky promontory
where the landing party had made a fortified camp. Here they found “nothing but
destruction,” Roberts writes, “which seemed to tell plainly the fate of those who had been
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left.”295 Potatoes lay scattered about and he speculates that the Quatomah, not knowing
what they were, had simply left them behind. He also writes the group noticed signs of a
“severe struggle,” but does not elaborate on what those signs were.296 This comment is
interesting because the battle between the Quatomah and the landing party, according to
Kirkpatrick, took place on June 10, a full fifteen days prior to Roberts and the others
arriving on the scene.
At this point, the search party found a discarded journal written by Kirkpatrick,
which Roberts says “gave some clue as to what had taken place.”297 Although he claims
he is quoting directly from it, strange inconsistencies appear almost immediately. For
example, according to Roberts, the first line stated the landing party “arrived at our post
on the 8th of June.”298 This is incorrect. The men were deposited onto the beach on June
9. Normally, this might be dismissed as a simple error. However, in light of their
agreement with Tichenor, who had promised to return in exactly fourteen days, this
seems highly unlikely. It is possible the date in Kirkpatrick’s journal was changed, as that
one day difference becomes highly significant if it led the landing party to abandon their
campsite early, which is what Roberts implies by stating they arrived at Port Orford on
time.
Kirkpatrick’s journal—as recounted by Roberts—goes on to say that thirty-three
Quatomah warriors attacked their camp the morning after their arrival, and that during the
battle they had discharged the cannon. Fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued until the
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Quatomah finally gave up and retreated, leaving “18 or 20 dead on the field.”299
According to Roberts, Kirkpatrick had written in his journal that three of their group had
suffered significant arrow wounds during the fighting, including himself, who had one
“through the neck.”300 Kirkpatrick never mentions having a neck wound in his account to
the Statesman, or any wound for that matter. He simply says, “There were four of our
men wounded,” but does not give any specifics as to whom and in what way. As they
were all well enough to travel close to seventy miles through the wilderness, though, it is
unlikely their injuries were that significant.
After the search party finished reading through Kirkpatrick’s journal they
descended the rocky promontory back down to the beach. At the bottom they noticed an
odd-looking patch of sand with several large stones upon it. “It struck us that someone
was buried there,” Roberts writes, and grabbing the oars from the whale boat to use as
shovels the men began digging until “The dead body of an Indian was found.”301 The
identity of this unfortunate individual is one of the most intriguing aspects of the
narrative surrounding Battle Rock. Although Roberts describes him as an “Indian” it is
unclear why he was buried in such an odd location, alone and separate from his fallen
comrades. Kirkpatrick never even mentions the man in his account. Decades later,
however, he would tell historian Orvil Dodge that he was a shipwrecked Russian sailor,
“who had been among the Indians for many years.”302
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This leads to the question of whether or not the search party could tell that it was
a white man, and if so why Roberts had reported the body belonged to an “Indian.” In his
account to Dodge, Kirkpatrick describes the man as having “yellow hair and a freckled
face.”303 Although he had been buried in the sand for two weeks it is likely these distinct,
non-Indian characteristics would have still been noticeable. According to Kirkpatrick, the
man had also stood out because he was not dressed in Quatomah garb.304 If he did not
have black hair or dark skin and was not dressed in Indian attire it is unclear why the
search party would think the man was one. After all, they were apparently able to discern
the body was not a member of the landing party, which would have been the logical
assumption considering his appearance and the nature of the burial.305 One possibility is
that Tichenor and Roberts, believing white on white violence would expose them to more
scrutiny, decided it would be better to report the man was an Indian, and the fact that
Kirkpatrick does not reveal this interesting detail until years later suggests he too may
have felt the same way.
After they had reburied the mysterious body, Roberts writes that Tichenor and
two other men climbed a nearby hill to search for more clues. Although he does not
provide the names of the men, it is likely these were the “two others” who had boarded
the Columbia with Tichenor back in San Francisco.306 While investigating on the hill they
supposedly discovered yet another journal that had been discarded, this one providing
more details about what had transpired. According to Roberts, the anonymous author of
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this journal wrote that the landing party “entertained some fears of the Indians, who
began to gather along the beach in considerable numbers.”307 As a result, Kirkpatrick and
the others set up the signal cannon so as to “rake the passage” leading up to their camp.308
The author says the Quatomah “appeared friendly at first,” and even wanted to trade.309
When they saw the Sea Gull leave, however, their attitude changed and they became
“saucy.”310 After demanding that Kirkpatrick and his men vacate the area, without
success, the Quatomah walked off into the woods.
According to this second journal, on the following morning the men were awoken
by the sound of Indians gathering on the beach below. More came up from the area
around the mouth of the Rogue River making “about 40 of them on the ground at
sunup.”311 This is a different figure than the very specific “thirty-three” given by
Kirkpatrick, and the number increases even more as the author of the second journal then
states that twelve more “came up the coast in a large canoe,” joining the others around a
bonfire.312 Interestingly, Kirkpatrick, in his subsequent account to the Statesman
newspaper, gives the exact same numbers as the anonymous author, as opposed to his
original “thirty-three.”313 This indicates he was influenced by Roberts’ account of the
second journal and modified his numbers so they would match.
The anonymous author then claims the Quatomah “held a kind of council of war”
while two or three others danced around the fire at a “furious rate, snapping their
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bowstrings at every turn they made.”314 This went on for half an hour during which time
even more Quatomah arrived. Soon, they began approaching the rocky promontory and
the author says “two or three of us went part of the way down the hill and motioned them
to keep off, but they were bent for a fight.”315 Ignoring the warnings, the Quatomah
advanced up the rock, forcing the men to retreat. As they got closer, one of the
Quatomah, “who appeared to be a leader among them,” grabbed the barrel of one of the
men’s rifles and tried to “wrest it from him; they—“316 It is here that Roberts says the
anonymous journal suddenly ended, “the remaining leaves having been without doubt
scattered about by the Indians.”317 That it supposedly stopped at that exact point seems
like a heavy-handed attempt at suspense building. It should also be noted that
Kirkpatrick, in his decades-later account to Orvil Dodge, revealed that the one who
grabbed the rifle was none other than the shipwrecked Russian sailor! This means the
highly significant detail of a white man leading the Quatomah was either not mentioned
in the anonymous second journal or that Roberts intentionally left it out of his account.
After relating the supposed contents of the anonymous second journal, the search
party decided it was “useless to remain on shore any longer” and reboarded the whale
boat to head back to the Columbia.318 When they were roughly halfway to the ship, a man
suddenly appeared back on the beach, “dressed in the clothing of a white man, wearing a
California hat, and having a rifle on his back.”319 Thinking it was a member of
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Kirkpatrick’s party, they immediately turned the boat around. As soon as they did,
however, the man “started for the woods.”320 Surprised, the group fired a rifle in the
man’s direction causing him to fall down and take cover, “just as the Indians in the canoe
had done.”321 After a few moments, though, he quickly got up and ran into the woods.
Roberts says the search party was now convinced that Kirkpatrick and his men must have
been “wholly or partially destroyed.”322
At the end of his letter to the newspaper, Roberts speculates on what may have
happened to the landing party, and makes the curious statement that they “acted very
foolishly and rashly” by abandoning their post. Obviously, this is something he could not
have known, and it is clear he is building an argument that Tichenor and the Pacific Mail
SS Co. are not to blame for whatever may have happened. The question we are left with
is how much of Roberts’ account is truth and how much of it is a fabrication? Believing
the landing party was dead, the two discarded journals the search party supposedly
discovered provided Roberts and Tichenor with the perfect narrative device through
which they could construct essentially whatever story they wanted. The anonymous
second journal seems particularly suspicious as it is conveniently free from any
association to a specific individual. Even its supposed discovery by Tichenor and his two
associates—away from the rest of the search party—seems to have been specifically
designed to insulate it from any scrutiny. While it is unlikely that both were entirely
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fabricated, as Kirkpatrick does say he left a journal behind, it appears, at the very least,
that certain “alterations” were made.
One example is the erroneous one-day-earlier arrival date supposedly written in
Kirkpatrick’s journal, which implies he believed Tichenor’s return would be on the 22nd
of June, as opposed to the agreed upon 23rd—something that Roberts awkwardly
emphasizes at the beginning of his account. Why does that one day matter? If they
believed Tichenor was late, when in fact he was not, and they abandoned their fortified
camp because of it, then they would have been acting “foolishly and rashly,” just as
Roberts claimed they were. The fact remains, if the men were either dead, captured, or
hopelessly lost in the woods, as was believed, then Roberts and Tichenor could say
whatever they wanted to protect the enterprise from being liable—even if that meant
making the Quatomah out to be hostile aggressors.
The situation changed on July 9 when word reached Portland the landing party, or
“Gallant Nine” as they were now being called, were not the victims of an Indian massacre
after all.323 The group had stumbled out of the wilderness alive and well on July 2, and
were recovering in the friendly confines of Scottsburg along the Umpqua River.324 A few
days after their safe return, Kirkpatrick read Roberts account in the newspaper and
became upset at what he felt was a poor portrayal of him and his men.325 Determined to
correct the record, he parted ways with the rest of the group and traveled north to
Portland, arriving there on July 14. The following day, the Oregon Statesman published a

323

Oregon Spectator, July 10, 1851, page 3
Ibid.
325
Webber and Kirkpatrick, Battle Rock, 52.
324

76

letter by Kirkpatrick in which he begins by stating, as leader of the landing party, it was
his duty to “make a plain statement of our transactions … and also give the reasons why
we left.”326 A fundamental element of his letter—one that cannot be overlooked—is his
desire to remain involved in the Port Orford enterprise. Kirkpatrick and the others had not
been paid up front. Instead, as was stated earlier, they had been promised “a share in the
town.”327 If he contradicted Roberts’ narrative too aggressively he risked alienating
himself and the others. This compelled him to operate within the confines of Roberts’
account. This is evident within the first few lines as Kirkpatrick copies, almost word for
word, the anonymous journal that Roberts had claimed was discovered by Tichenor.
The landing, establishing the camp on top of the rock, positioning the cannon, the
fears about the Quatomah—all of the details that were in the journal are exactly the same
in Kirkpatrick’s account to the Statesman. Even the number of Quatomah, which had
been a very specific “thirty-three” in his own journal, now matched the much higher
figure given in the anonymous one.328 And whereas the latter had ended in the dubious
cliffhanger of the “Indian” grabbing the barrel of a rifle and trying to pull it away from
one of the men, Kirkpatrick now seamlessly picks up the story by saying another member
of the group came to the rescue and struck the man over the hands until he let go.
Kirkpatrick claims the enraged Quatomah then shot a “volley of arrows” at the landing
party before continuing their hostile advance up the narrow ridge.329
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The war party was approximately six feet from the mouth of the cannon when
Kirkpatrick decided to set it off with a firebrand, instantly “killing some six or eight
dead.”330 It had been packed with two handfuls of one-inch bar lead, creating what must
have been a horrifically gruesome scene. In the stunned, blood-splattered aftermath,
chaos and confusion ensued, and Kirkpatrick’s men mercilessly took advantage of this
with a “discharge from our rifles and pistols.”331 Only three warriors made it through the
barrage and into the men’s camp, and they were quickly knocked down and beaten with
rifle butts. When the survivors finally broke and ran, many having hurled themselves off
the rock into the ocean, Kirkpatrick says they left behind “thirteen dead on the
ground.”332 It should be noted this figure differs from the “18 or 20” written in his
journal.333 Although, he then matches Roberts’ account by saying he later learned from
an Indian at the mouth of the Umpqua River that there were “20 killed and 15 wounded”
in the battle.334 As was stated earlier, Kirkpatrick says “four of our men were wounded,”
but he mentions nothing about an arrow wound through his own neck.335
Later that afternoon, “a chief came up the beach and made signs that he wanted to
come into camp.”336 Once the landing party allowed him to do so he slowly carried away
his dead comrades. Kirkpatrick attempted to communicate that “in fourteen days from the
time that we arrived there, we would go away again.”337 Meaning on June 23, when
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Tichenor had promised to return, he and his men would leave the area. Of course, this
was a lie and Kirkpatrick was simply buying time until reinforcements arrived. He adds
they were not “troubled by them [the Quatomah] any more until the morning of the 15th
day.”338 This means the landing party was still at Port Orford on June 24—one day after
Roberts claims the Columbia arrived on the scene. This is the point where Kirkpatrick,
unwilling to be depicted in the press as someone who acted “foolishly and rashly,” breaks
from Roberts by claiming he and the others had not abandoned their post early.339
When judging the veracity of Kirkpatrick’s account, it is important to remember
that Roberts’ letter had put him on the defensive. He needed to justify the actions of him
and his men. As such, it was in his own best interest to depict the Quatomah in as hostile
a light as possible. This is to say nothing of the effect that racial stereotypes and youthful
bravado had on his account. While little is known about his life, it is clear he was
someone who was very concerned about establishing a particular persona. Years later, a
member of the landing party told an interviewer they had appointed him as leader of the
expedition, despite the fact he was only twenty-three years old, because he had repeatedly
told them he was a close friend and protégé of Kit Carson, and had extensive “knowledge
and experience of Indian cunning and fighting…”340 In an interview of his own, three
decades after the Port Orford incident, Kirkpatrick romantically depicts himself as a
grand old Indian-fighter who wandered the West and “made it safe for the soldiers to go
there.”341 Not only does he reference his close friendship with Carson, he also places

338

Ibid.
The Weekly Times, Portland, July 3, 1851, page 2
340
“Bloody Baptism of Battle Rock,” The Sunday Oregonian, January 11, 1903, page 1.
341
“Far West Experiences,” The Eutaw Whig and Observer, March 22, 1883, page 1
339

79

himself alongside some of the central figures of early Oregon history. Ultimately, it was
this fierce attentiveness to his own image that compelled him, perhaps against his better
judgement, to refute the timeframe that Roberts had established.
Kirkpatrick states the Quatomah, having been led to believe the men were leaving
on June 23, angrily prepared for another attack on the morning of the 24th. He claims
there were “a great many more at the second fight than at the first,” and that roughly 150
warriors had amassed at the base of the rocky promontory.342 The threat of the cannon
seems to have held them at bay and Kirkpatrick says their chief “could not prevail on
them to make a second rush on us.”343 Instead, they shot arrows from a distance of three
hundred yards and although many of the projectiles fell into the camp none of men in the
landing party “received the slightest injury.”344
Despite the unwillingness of the Quatomah to attack again, Kirkpatrick says the
men had to make a decision. “We had not more than eight or nine rounds of shot left, and
we were surrounded by at least 150 Indians.”345 The only viable option, in his view, was
to “take to the woods and make our way to the habitation of white men.”346 Fortune
appeared to favor this plan when the majority of the Quatomah suddenly moved off down
the beach and built several bonfires at the mouth of a small creek, leaving only a few
warriors behind to keep watch. Kirkpatrick and the other men pretended as if they were
preparing for battle and eventually “this movement had the desired effect.”347 The few
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remaining warriors all left and ran down the beach to join the others. Seeing their chance,
the landing party quickly descended the rocky promontory and ran off through the woods,
“for about five miles,” before heading back out onto the beach.348 They then, “traveled
up the beach,” which implies they were going north, until they ran into a group of thirty
warriors, “all armed with bows and arrows and long knives.”349 Kirkpatrick claims he and
the other eight men heroically charged at the Indians “and when they saw that we would
attack them, they broke for the timber.”350 This somewhat dubious story is suspiciously
reminiscent of the Anabasis, Xenophon’s famous account of Greek hoplites escaping to
safety from behind enemy lines.351 The work was extremely popular in antebellum
America, particularly during the Mexican War.352
After their encounter with the warriors, Kirkpatrick and his men “continued up
the coast” for the next two days, alternating between the woods and the beach.353
Eventually, they came across a fresh path, “where a great many Indians had trailed up the
coast.”354 The men followed it for five miles until they reached the mouth of a small
creek where it suddenly stopped and turned back again. Kirkpatrick speculates the
Indians “followed us thus far the first night,” and this was where they had given up and
gone back home.355 Needless to say, this statement is confusing. If the landing party had
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been travelling for two days how could they have just reached the point where the Indians
who were chasing them on the first night had given up and turned around?
Kirkpatrick’s account gets even more perplexing when he says the group
continued “up the beach” for about fifteen miles before they came to “the mouth of the
Rogue River.”356 How is it possible for them to have just arrived at a river that was
twenty miles south of Port Orford? The logical explanation is that they mistook another
river, such as the Coquille, for the Rogue. This is exactly what E.A. Schwartz surmises in
his history of the Rogue River War.357 Stephen Dow Beckham, in his study of the war,
does not even speculate he simply changes it to the Coquille.358 The problem with this is
that in Roberts’ account he quotes the anonymous journal as saying the Quatomah had
come north “from towards the mouth of the Rogue River,” which means the men knew
exactly where it was located.359 While this may have simply been a mistake, another
intriguing possibility is the anonymous journal, or at least that section of it, was
fabricated by someone who was not a member of the landing party.
Assuming it was simply a mistake, Kirkpatrick and the other men arrived at the
Coquille River and found two large Indian villages on the opposite bank. “As soon as
they saw us,” he writes, “they prepared for a fight.”360 The Indians supposedly lit a
bonfire on top of a bluff in preparation for battle, and with “nothing but the river between
us,” Kirkpatrick says he and the others fled back into the woods.361 They traveled upriver
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for roughly eight miles, eventually lashing together some old logs to cross to the other
side, before quickly making their way up into the mountains. It seems odd that none of
the supposedly battle-hungry Indians from the villages had followed the group, but
Kirkpatrick never mentions them again.
Kirkpatrick continues his account by stating that it had been four days since he
and the others had eaten anything other than salmonberries. Why they had not taken any
food with them when they left the promontory is another puzzling aspect of his story.
According to Roberts’ description of their abandoned campsite, the men still had pilot
bread and potatoes when they set out—and that was just what was left untouched by the
Quatomah.362 That none of the men thought to throw some food into a sack before
running off into the wilderness seems unlikely. Although, it is possible they believed they
were closer to a Euro-American settlement than they actually were, or perhaps they
simply ate everything on their first night in the woods. Regardless, the group was in
desperate need of food.
Moving tentatively back down to the beach, they were able to find some mussels,
“which revived us some.”363 Not long after, they arrived at the mouth of a river, thought
to be the Coos, and “got among some friendly Indians” who gave the men something to
eat.364 Kirkpatrick writes they then “struck out across the sand hills” and waded through a
swamp before arriving on the following morning at the mouth of the Umpqua River—
eight days after abandoning the rocky promontory.365 When they stumbled into Umpqua
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City, the settlers apparently greeted the men with cheers and a “hearty shake of the
hand.”366 Not long after, they traveled upriver to Scottsburg, where they rested for a few
days. It was here that Kirkpatrick read Roberts’ account in the newspaper and then left
the group for Portland.
Toward the end of his letter to the Statesman, Kirkpatrick directly addresses the
account given by Roberts. “I submit these facts to the decision of our fellow citizens,” he
writes, “to know whether we acted foolishly and rashly, as has been stated by a certain
gentleman [Roberts] in a letter to the Oregonian, or not.”367 He then refutes the claim that
Tichenor returned on time and says, quite remarkably, “As dead men make no
contradictions, this gentleman had smoothed the matter over by making an incorrect
statement of the time so as to lay all blame upon us.”368 He quickly follows this up by
writing that he is the “last man to lay any blame on Captain Tichenor,” and that he is
aware of the circumstances that detained him in San Francisco.369 It is possible that
Kirkpatrick was unaware of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company’s involvement in the
enterprise, instead believing that Tichenor was the only one needing appeasement.
Perhaps his youthful sense of bravado would not allow him to see that Roberts was much
more than an impartial witness, or perhaps he was simply naïve. Perhaps he knew exactly
who Roberts was and what he was doing, but decided that protecting his honor was worth
the risk of being ousted from Port Orford.

366

Ibid.
Ibid.
368
Ibid.
369
Ibid.
367

84

Whatever the case may be, after praising Tichenor one final time, Kirkpatrick
gives a lengthy and somewhat awkward sales pitch of Port Orford, painting it as a
veritable Eden just waiting to be settled. Not only did he claim it had the “richest soil”
and “finest timber” he had ever seen, he makes sure to add that he and his men saw traces
of both coal and gold in the hills.370 “It will in all probability become an important point,”
he writes.371 This last section of the letter is clearly meant to ingratiate himself to
Tichenor and promote his continued involvement in the endeavor, despite his public
refutation of Roberts’ timeframe. Whether he was successful or not is unclear. Although,
it should be noted that Kirkpatrick’s name never again appears in reports surrounding the
enterprise.
For the next few decades, the Roberts and Kirkpatrick letters were the only
accounts of what transpired between the landing party and the Quatomah written by
people who were directly involved. This somewhat surprising documentary silence in the
aftermath of the event helped to solidify its historicity. By as early as 1855, four years
after the incident, the large, rocky promontory on the beach was already being referred to
as “Battle Rock,” and the supposedly heroic actions of its nine “defenders” had been
firmly enshrined in regional lore.
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EPILOGUE

After Tichenor and the rest of the search party had left the Port Orford site,
fearing the worst, they continued on to Portland where Roberts’ account was delivered to
a local newspaper. Tichenor then took the Columbia back down the coast, arriving in San
Francisco on July 1. In his memoirs, he claims that when he related the news of the
supposed massacre of the landing party it caused “much feeling” in the city.372
Capitalizing on this, he quickly printed handbills that not only decried the “tragedy,” but
simultaneously promoted the gold mining prospects in the region.373 Within a few days,
Tichenor’s propaganda campaign had mustered what he described as sixty-seven,
“desperate bad men,” and under the command of one of his partners, James S. Gamble,
the heavily-armed force, bent on retribution, returned to the Port Orford site—this time to
stay.374
Over the next few weeks, the men erected “two forts on commanding points,” and
secured the area within an extensive palisade.375 Then, at the end of August, 1851, an
expedition of twenty-three men, led by one of Tichenor’s partners, William G. T’Vault,
set out to carve a path that would connect the fledgling settlement to the gold mines in the
interior. Traveling south until they reached the Rogue, the group turned inland and slowly
made their way upriver. After several days of what seemed to be aimless wandering,
some of the men began to question T’Vault’s pathfinding abilities, ultimately quitting the

372

Tichenor, Reminiscences, 17.
Patrick Masterson, Port Orford, a History, (Wilsonville, Oregon: Book Partners, 1994), 4.
374
Tichenor, Reminiscences, 17.
375
“Port Orford Correspondence,” Daily Alta California, August 1, 1851.
373

86

expedition outright and making their way back to Port Orford. The remaining group—
nine in total—continued on and eventually reached the Coquille River. There, some
Upper Coquille Indians loaded the starving and exhausted men into canoes and took them
downstream to a large village at the river’s mouth. When the men stepped ashore they
were attacked. T’Vault and three others managed to escape, but the other five men in the
group were killed.
On the same day that T’Vault and the others were attacked, Anson Dart, the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, arrived in Port Orford accompanied by Lt. August
Kautz and twenty dragoons. Kautz had orders to establish an army post to provide
protection for settlers arriving on the coast. Dart was there to establish treaties with the
Quatomah and their Tututni neighbors. On September 20, 1851, Dart sat with the “chiefs
and headmen” and promised them various items of clothing, tobacco, kettles, and other
goods, along with $2,500 a year for ten years. In exchange, the Tututni ceded all of the
land between the Rogue and Coquille rivers from the coastline up to the summit of the
Cascade mountains—roughly six hundred square miles. Although both parties “set their
hands” to the treaty, it was never ratified by Congress.376
When news of the attack on T’Vault’s party reached San Francisco, the
commander of the Department of the Pacific, General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, deployed
130 additional soldiers to Port Orford with orders to “punish and subdue” the
Coquilles.377 On November 22, 1851, the punitive expedition located the Coquille’s
camp. Ten soldiers in two canoes casually rowed upstream, serving as a distraction, while
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the rest of the force quietly flanked the Coquille’s position. When the latter, spotting the
men in the canoes, began firing their rifles, Col. Silas Casey ordered his men to attack—
killing fifteen. Two American soldiers injured in the clash later died of their wounds.378
This “officially” began a cycle of violence in the region that would last for the better part
of a decade.
J.M. Kirkpatrick’s claim that Port Orford would become an “important point” was
indeed accurate, although probably not in the way he had imagined. It never became the
next San Francisco, as Tichenor and his partners had hoped it would. Instead, it became a
nexus point in the conquest and subjugation of Indigenous groups in southwestern
Oregon. Over the next several years, the “desperate bad men” that Tichenor had recruited
in San Francisco, continued to flow into the region—many operating out of Port
Orford—and this contingent of Mexican War veterans, disillusioned miners, and shiftless
“pikes,” played a fundamental role in the outbreak of what has been called the Rogue
River War.379 In June of 1856, after five years of immense heartache and bloodshed, the
steamship Columbia returned once again to Port Orford, this time to transport 1,500
Indigenous survivors to what would become the Siletz Reservation.380
During this turbulent period, the rocky promontory upon which the Port Orford
landing party and the Quatomah had clashed was transformed into a kind of sacred space
known as “Battle Rock”—the name it still possesses today. According to historian Orvil
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Dodge, in the spring of 1857, a leader of the Indigenous resistance named Enos Thomas
was taken down to the beach and “hanged on historical Battle Rock, where his body was
buried.”381 Hangings were conducted on the rock at least twice during the period,
indicating its symbolic importance.382 In articles and early histories, writers frequently
referred to the rock as having undergone a “bloody baptism,” which along with the
executions, implies that it had an altar-like status to Euro-Americans in the region.383 In
the 1920’s, the body of Erastus Summers, one of the members of the Port Orford landing
party, was disinterred by his descendants and reburied on top of the rock along with his
wife and son, presumably alongside the bodies of Enos and the other Indian who was
executed.
Despite the rock’s cultural importance, for decades the only narrative of its
celebrated transformation were the two letters provided by Roberts and Kirkpatrick. That
was it. Then, in 1871, Anson Dart, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, who two decades
prior had attempted to establish treaties with the Quatomah and others, sent a letter to the
chairman of the Bureau of Indian Commissioners in which he provided “some curious
revelations” about what had occurred between the Port Orford landing party and the
Quatomah.384 Dart claimed the so-called “battle” had actually been “an atrocious
massacre of peaceable and friendly Indians.”385 He goes on to say the Quatomah had
helped Kirkpatrick and the other men carry supplies to the top of the rock, and were then
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told to come back just before dark “to get their pay.”386 When the Quatomah returned,
they climbed up the promontory’s narrow passage and into a brutal ambush.
Dart’s account, however, is filled with inconsistencies, and he conflates specific
details from two separate events. For example, he says that “some sixty or more” men
were in the original landing party, which is obviously incorrect. Although, that is roughly
the same number of men that Tichenor returned with on August 14.387 He then states that
an eight-man expedition was “engaged in their work of exploration in the interior when
the cannon was discharged and the Indians killed,” clearly referring to the later T’Vault
expedition.388 Still, despite its errors, Dart’s account is intriguing, and two years later it
was published in the San Francisco Chronicle under the headline “Early White
Treachery.”389
One week after Dart’s account appeared in the newspaper a mysterious letter was
sent anonymously to the editor of the Chronicle by a person referring to themselves as
“Pioneer.”390 The individual claimed they had been at the landing, “and assisted in
carrying things from the boat.”391 Although he may have simply been a crew member
aboard the Sea Gull, the author later refers to “our party,” which implies he was one of
the nine who stayed.392 Angrily refuting the details of Dart’s letter, the man scoffs at the
idea that a “party of only nine men would go to such a remote and unknown place as
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early as 1851 and commence war with a tribe of Indians…”393 This argument is valid,
and it seems unlikely that Kirkpatrick’s party would have intentionally instigated an
attack on an unknown number of Indians knowing they would be alone in the wilderness
without reinforcements for two weeks.
Twenty five years after these two letters appeared in the Chronicle, Kirkpatrick
reappeared and wrote a second, much more detailed account of the Port Orford landing
for the historian, Orvil Dodge. Entitled The Heroes of Battle Rock, this glossy,
streamlined narrative “corrected” the inconsistencies in the two original accounts,
synthesizing them into a cohesive whole.394 This version became the “official” story of
Battle Rock, and has been used by historians up to the present day. 395 One interesting
aspect of the text is its negative depiction of Tichenor. The claims about the men not
being provided with sufficient weaponry, and his insistence that the Quatomah were
“perfectly friendly,” first appear in this latter version. It seems that Kirkpatrick, now
around 70 years old, was no longer concerned about appeasing anyone who had been
involved in the Port Orford enterprise. Despite this added color, the story itself is the
same byproduct of the original newspaper accounts. Whatever truth may have been
lurking beneath the lines of the original letters is buried even deeper in this second, more
romanticized version.
While we will never know exactly what happened on top of the rocky
promontory, there are two lesser-known accounts that provide a glimpse. In 1886, one of
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the members of the Port Orford landing party, John Egan, made an appearance at a
meeting of Indian war veterans and spoke briefly about the events at Battle Rock.
According to him, on the day of the “battle,” a large group of Quatomah had climbed the
rocky promontory wanting to get into their camp. Egan states that he and a couple of
others “stopped them at a little plateau about ten feet from the [top of the] rock and
parleyed with them there, where about twenty could stand.”396 He goes on to say they
were determined to hold them but the “pressure from behind was too strong, so we fell
further back…”397 This implies that Egan and the others were physically touching the
Quatomah in the front, which, along with the supposed parleying, is not something that
would have happened if the men had truly been under attack. The traditional narrative,
however, would have us believe that at this point there were arrows whizzing through the
air.
Egan continues by claiming the Quatomah began “snatching at our clothes,
provisions and other property.”398 Eventually, a member of the landing party came
forward with an armful of shirts and “threw them among the Indians.”399 This action
created a frenzy on top of the narrow walkway as the Quatomah scrambled for the items.
“Like Oliver Twist,” Egan states, “they wanted more … and with a rush came at us.”400
This is the moment when the cannon exploded in the morning air, its lead bar shot tearing
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through the clamoring crowd, and suddenly, with this new information, the heroic
“defense” of Battle Rock becomes something much different.
The “rush” of the Quatomah, as described by Egan, is reminiscent of Nathan
Scholfield’s encounter one year prior as part of the Klamath Exploring Expedition.401
When he and Mr. Helbert, traveling up the beach twenty miles south of the Port Orford
area, had disrespectfully walked past the seated headman and his warriors rather than sit
down with them, the crowd of Tututni who were following “pressed in on” the men and
began snatching at their possessions, eventually taking a hatchet.402 Historian James P.
Ronda and anthropologist David H. French have both argued that Indigenous groups in
the region committed what Euro-Americans viewed as theft as a way to enforce a certain
standard of reciprocity.403 This could be payment for passage through their lands or for a
service rendered, such as helping portage a canoe.404 In the account provided by Anson
Dart, later published in the San Francisco Chronicle, he claims the Quatomah had helped
the landing party carry the cannon to the top of the rocky promontory. This was
corroborated by the mysterious “Pioneer,” who reluctantly states that the Quatomah “did
assist some.”405 However, he insists they had “volunteered” and there was no promise of
payment, as Dart had claimed.
The other, lesser-known account is a statement delivered by a controversial figure
named Elwood Alfred Towner, “Attorney for Oregon Indians.” Towner was a fervent
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anti-Semite and supporter of Adolf Hitler who traveled around the Pacific Northwest in
the 1930s delivering lectures as “Chief Red Cloud.” Wearing a full headdress and white
deerskin outfit decorated with thunderbirds and swastikas, Towner warned audiences
about the Jewish threat to America. He had grown up on the Siletz Reservation and
conducted a small law practice in Portland representing various Native American
causes.406 In 1932, Towner wrote a letter to the Myrtle Point Herald providing the
“Indian point of view” regarding Battle Rock. He states that he was “raised among the
Indian people whose ancestors lived on Rogue River…” and the story of what happened
that day was part of their oral tradition.407 Towner claims that when the Quatomah had
learned the Sea Gull was in the harbor at Port Orford, they formed a “welcoming or
reception committee,” as they had done in the past when Tichenor had come to visit
them.408 When they arrived on the beach, however, the Sea Gull had already departed and
the nine men left behind were unfamiliar with “Indians, their language or customs.”409
The Quatomah, according to Towner, lit a large bonfire and performed a welcoming
ceremony for the men, which may have been the so-called “war dance” described in
Kirkpatrick’s account. Afterwards, they went up the rocky promontory to exchange gifts,
“and through fear and the excitement of the occasion,” were attacked by the men.410
This falls in line with Egan’s account, and when pieced together with elements
from Dart, a more plausible picture emerges of a horrific massacre brought about by fear
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and misunderstanding. This was not an accident, though. Kirkpatrick and the other men
in the landing party arrived in Port Orford looking for trouble, and they found it. While it
was certainly not his intention, Egan humanizes the Quatomah. His account, bolstered by
Towner’s statement, liberates them from the narrative constructed by Roberts and
Kirkpatrick—which has clouded the truth for over 150 years. They are no longer a
stereotypical horde of aggressive, warlike Indians, but a complex and outgoing people
trying to adapt to a rapidly changing world. The new details are also more compatible
with earlier, documented interactions. In fact, when Towner mentions the “welcoming
committee” going down to the beach to greet Kirkpatrick and the others, it is reminiscent
of one of their very first encounters with outsiders—that bright spring day in 1792, when
the Quatomah excitedly paddled out to Vancouver’s ship, and climbed aboard saying,
“my friends, my friends…”411
The historian Carl Becker once said there are “two histories: the actual series of
events that once occurred; and the ideal series that we affirm and hold in memory.”412
Throughout the twentieth century the idealized narrative of Battle Rock was annually
reaffirmed through celebratory reenactments. These began in 1911 when the grandson of
William Tichenor organized a Port Orford Agate Carnival “with clambakes, pioneer
reunions, prizes for the biggest fish caught and the finest agates picked up from the
beaches …”413 The grand finale of the three-day event was a reenactment of the “historic
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conflict” of Battle Rock between “a tribe of make believe Indians and the whites.”414 The
carnival was a rousing success, and the following year it was enlarged to include sporting
events as a well as a minstrel show. Of course, “the most spectacular event” was again
the reenactment, where the old cannon “held the fort against 100 howling redskins in war
paint.”415 A local chapter, or “tribe,” of the fraternal organization known as the Improved
Order of Red Men was invited to dress up in “Indian” garb and charge the rock,
beginning a tradition of various organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America,
portraying one of the sides in the battle.
This type of ritual performance, in which Euro-American men dress up as
“Indians,” has held a prominent place in American culture dating back to before the
Boston Tea Party in 1773. Over the years, a myriad of fraternal organizations such as the
Freemasons, the Knights of Columbus, the Odd Fellows, and the second iteration of the
Ku Klux Klan, among many others, have conducted costumed dramas as a way of
legitimizing a specific ideological past and connecting it to an equally specific
ideological present. Historian Philip J. Deloria has argued that white male appropriation
of “Indianness” was born out of an anxiety surrounding the creation of a new, wholly
American identity. In the minds of Euro-Americans, the continent’s Indigenous peoples
represented oppositional figures in this process of ethnogenesis—at once celebrated for
their authenticity and freedom, while at the same time derided for their perceived
savagery. As Deloria writes, “There was, quite simply, no way to conceive an American
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identity without Indians. At the same time, there was no way to make a complete identity
while they remained.”416
The myth of the vanishing Indian, which proclaimed it was part of a natural order
for less advanced societies to disappear in the face of “civilization,” attempted to resolve
this critical dilemma by arguing that the death and removal of Indigenous peoples was
ultimately beyond anyone’s control. It was simply a matter of destiny. This created a
framework by which the spirit of the “Indian,” with an intrinsic connection to the land,
particularly the idea of the land, could be absorbed into the new, Euro-American identity,
while the being itself—the “savage”—could be rejected. “Indianness” was appropriated
by fraternal organizations, such as the Improved Order of Red Men, to not only signify
patriotism, but also a justifiable connection to the country’s ancient traditions.
The vanishing Indian trope also worked to transform colonialist guilt into a matter
of fate, thereby absolving Euro-Americans of atrocities committed against Indigenous
peoples. This belief in the inevitable march of civilization has been bolstered by histories
that emphasize the hostility and savagery of Native Americans, while painting settlers as
innocent “defenders” against this aggression.417 The very act of remembering becomes a
colonialist tool that perpetuates a false narrative.418 The history surrounding Battle Rock
is a perfect example of this kind of propaganda. Eventually, the annual Port Orford Agate
Carnival was replaced by a Fourth of July Jubilee, where the reenactment was again used
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as the grand finale until the year 2000, when it was stopped all together. This association
with American Independence promoted the idea that Battle Rock was a heroic and
patriotic foundational tale. Although sentiments have changed in recent decades—the
wayside sign has undergone several revisions—there is still a debate amongst Port Orford
residents and the Confederated Tribes of the Siletz on how to commemorate the
landmark. In this way, the encounter that began 170 years ago is ongoing.
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